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I. INTRODUCTION
HARvEY GOLDMAN:
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
This should be a very interesting panel, Let me
introduce our moderator, Rick Climan of
Cooley Godward in California's Silicon Valley.
Rick...
Thanks Harvey. Welcome to our session on
negotiating public company acquisitions. As
Harvey mentioned, my name is Rick Climan.
I head the M&A Group at Cooley Godward in
California and I'm going to be moderating the
presentation this afternoon. Our other panelists
are Lou Kling, a partner at Skadden Arps in
New York City, and Joel Greenberg, who co-
chairs the Corporate and Finance Department
at Kaye Scholer, also in NewYork City. We are
also extremely fortunate to have with us Chief
Justice Norman Veasey of the Delaware
Supreme Court.
Our panel will be focusing on a type of
transaction that has become commonplace
during the merger wave of the last five-plus
years - a single-step, stock-for-stock merger
involving two publicly-traded U.S. companies.
We assume, for purposes of our hypothetical
merger, that the two companies are of disparate
size, so that there is an identifiable acquiror (the
larger of the two companies) and an identifiable
target company (the smaller of two companies).
We also assume that this will be a stock-for-
stock deal - a stock swap - so that the target
company's stockholders will, pursuant to the
merger, exchange their target company shares
for shares of the acquiring company's stock.
I should mention that, notwithstanding our
selection of a one-step, stock swap merger as the
focus of our presentation today, many, if not
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most, of the issues that we'll be discussing are
also relevant in the context of other forms of
public company acquisitions, including cash
mergers and two-step acquisitions involving a
first-step tender or exchange offer followed by
a back-end merger.
The materials for our presentation' are
included in the program binders. They consist
of a series of excerpts from both the preliminary
and the definitive documentation for a stock-
for-stock merger. An index to these various
excerpts appears at the beginning of the
materials, and you might want to turn to that
index now to get a sense for what we're going to
be covering.
Our format this afternoon is going to be a
modified mock negotiation, with Joel
Greenberg generally playing the role of the
acquiror's counsel and Lou Kling generally
playing the role ofthe target company's counsel.
I will be asking our negotiators to step out of
character quite frequently in order to explain
their negotiating positions, and I'll also be
soliciting the commentary of Chief Justice
Veasey on some of the Delaware law issues that
arise in these negotiations.
IX. STANDSTILL PROVISION
We begin today at the beginning - with the very
first document that the parties typically
negotiate and execute in an M&A deal. That
document is, of course, the confidentiality
agreement, the first draft of which is typically
served up by counsel for the target company.
If you take a look at our materials, you'll see
[in Appendix A] that here the confidentiality
agreement proffered by the target company's
counsel, in addition to including traditional
9 These materials are reproduced as appendices to this article.
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LOU KLING:
(Target Counsel)
restrictions on the use and disclosure of the
target company's sensitive information, contains
another provision - a so-called standstill
provision. This provision prohibits the
prospective acquiror - in this case for a period
of three full years - from launching a hostile
tender offer or proxy fight and from otherwise
engaging in overtly coercive or hostile conduct
with respect to the target. And ifyou take a close
look at the standstill provision, you'll note that
it goes even further. It also prohibits the
prospective acquiror from engaging in less
blatantly offensive but still potentially coercive
conduct, such as simply proposing afriendly deal.
Indeed, it even goes so far as to prohibit the
prospective acquiror from asking the target for
a waiver of the standstill provision.
Let me begin with a question for Lou Kling
who proposed this standstill provision as
counsel for the target company. Lou, what
exactly is the rationale for including a provision
like this in a confidentiality agreement? Why do
you need something so remarkably broad?
The reason is that the prospective buyer is not
committed to anything at this point. We're in
the early days of the process, and while it may
go somewhere, it may also not go anywhere at
all. We're starting down a road where, from the
target's perspective, we're trying to do a
friendly, negotiated transaction. We want to
make sure it stays that way. We're starting out
on the assumption that it's going to be a friendly
deal, so we're asking the prospective buyer
essentially to commit that it won't go hostile on
us - that it's going to stay friendly.
Beyond that, we don't know where this is
going to go, but we need to manage the process.
The target's board of directors needs to be in
control of what's going to happen to the target.
One way for the target's board to be able to
remain in control is to have this prospective
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buyer, along with any other prospective buyer
we talk to, agree to be bound by a standstill
provision. We'll decide when and if we want to
get acquisition proposals from people and what
form they have to be in. We don't want to
create a free-for-all.
Lou, do you take any comfort from the fact that
you have a separate use provision (that we've
reproduced as paragraph 2 of your form of
confidentiality agreement [in Appendix A]) - a
provision that contractually precludes the
prospective acquiror from using the target
company's sensitive information for anything
other than a negotiated transaction? Doesn't your
client, the target, get the protection it needs
from a provision that precludes the prospective
acquiror from using this information to
formulate a hostile bid?
Well, I think it's of some benefit for the target to
have that provision. However, as an evidentiary
matter, it can get very difficult, particularly in
the murky context of trying to enforce a
confidentiality agreement to begin with, to show
what particular information is being used by a
bidder and what isn't being used. People just
can't compartmentalize their minds that way.
As counsel for the target, I would take the
position that anybody affiliated with the
prospective acquiror who has access to the
target's confidential information would
essentially taint the prospective acquiror.
However, proving that in court is a different
matter. So we need a broad, absolute standstill
in addition to the more limited use restriction.
So, Joel, let's have at it. You've included [in
Appendix B] a summary of your objections to
the standstill provision served up by Lou. What
bothers you the most here as counsel for the
prospective acquiror?
20021
224 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:219
JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
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LOU KLING:
(Target Counsel)
What I want to do is to confine Lou's standstill
provision to the purposes that Lou outlined.
I'm willing to limit the ability of my client to go
hostile against this target, but the provision goes
much further than that as drafted. For example,
the provision covers not only my client, the
prospective buyer, but also all of its representa-
tives, which include, for example, any financial
advisor to the prospective buyer or any of its
subsidiaries, whether or not the advisor is
involved in this particular transaction. I don't
think you need to sweep the world quite that
broadly.
Similarly, the provision extends protection
not only to the target, but also to the target's
affiliates. I don't know why a publicly traded
corporation that happens to be a 12%
stockholder of the target - and therefore quite
possibly an affiliate of the target - should
suddenly get the benefit of my client not being
able to go hostile against them just because my
client has gotten information not about them,
but about the target.
Finally, three years is awfully long for this
kind of provision. It's one thing to manage a
process to its natural conclusion and to place
restrictions on a prospective buyer while the
target's confidential information has some real
value. But three years, as opposed to, say, six
months, is an excessive period.
Can we stop there for a second? What are'you
seeing these days with respect to the duration of
these standstills, whether in the auction context
or outside the auction context? Are you ever
seeing standstills that stay in effect for two to
three years, or are you normally seeing eighteen
months, or a year, or even six months?
I would say two years is the outside, and one
year is more common than two. It goes to what
Joel said. First, how long is it going to take the
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LOU KLING:
(Target Counsel)
process that we're starting to play out? You
expect most processes to be completed in six
months to a year. And second, when does the
information, particularly forward looking
information, become stale or public and
therefore no longer really of use?
Joel, let's cut to the chase here and take a look at
the fall away provision you're proposing to
include as a limitation on Lou's standstill
provision. This fall away provision [included in
Appendix B] says that the standstill restrictions
will terminate prematurely under certain
circumstances. Why don't you explain why, as
counsel for the prospective acquiror, you feel
that this standstill provision should ever fall
away - should ever terminate prematurely -
before the end of the negotiated one to two-year
term.
It's because we're prepared to limit ourselves to
the managed process only as long as it stays a
managed process. But we don't want to be left
standing at the gate if someone else goes hostile
and suddenly the target company is the subject
of a very public bidding war. In that case, the
target's board hasn't achieved what it wanted to,
which is a totally managed process, and my
client - the potential buyer here - could be
disadvantaged by having to stand on the
sidelines while the target's board does whatever
it's going to do.
Lou, how do you react to Joel's request for a
fall-away provision?
Well, a third-party hostile bidder coming in
could represent a lot of different possible
situations. The new bidder may be somebody
that we're not particularly concerned about -
someone we don't think has the financial
resources to really consummate a transaction
2002]
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(MODERATOR)
with the target; and while we can't control that
new third-party bidder, that doesn't mean we
want this new bidder, whom we can essentially
ignore, to touch off a free-for-all by freeing
other prospective acquirors from their standstill
obligations. And particularly in the case where
the new third-party bidder does not have
confidential information about the target, that
third party is at a significant disadvantage vis-1-
vis Joel's client in terms of what it could put on
the table. So, we don't want to release Joel's
client, which has the advantage of having
confidential information, to join a situation and
cause it to spiral out of control.
Right. Obviously, one of the best defenses that
the target has against a truly hostile bidder is the
inability of the hostile bidder to do the kind of
extensive due diligence that Joel and his client
had the opportunity to do after signing a
confidentiality agreement with the target. But
there's another facet to what Joel has proffered
here. The particular prong of Joel's fall-away
provision that we've been discussing says that
the standstill terminates if the target is put in
play by virtue of a third-party hostile tender
offer or proxy fight. But there's another prong
- clause (iii) of Joel's fall-away provision [in
Appendix B] - which says that if a definitive
acquisition agreement is actually signed up by
Lou's client, the target company, with a third
party, then Joel's client is free to go ahead and
launch something hostile. PresumablyJoel has
proposed this recognizing that any signed
definitive acquisition agreement with a third
party will undoubtedly include break-up fee
provisions and other deal protections with
which Joel's client will need to contend if it still
wishes to make a play for the target company.
Lou, as counsel to the target company, how do
you react to this additional prong of the fall-
away provision?
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I don't think it's a completely unfair clause, but
at the end of the day, if my client, the target,
signed up a deal with a third party, it's because
the third party put more on the table than Joel's
client did. IfJoel's client knows that it has only
one shot because it's going to be subject to an
ironclad standstill, Joel's client will have to put
its fullest price on the table now, up front, to
avoid our signing up that definitive acquisition
agreement with the third party. I don't want
Joel's client to think that it could keep some
money in its pocket and be free to come back
later on and bid more then. I want Joel's client
to make its best bid now. So, for that reason, I
don't want the standstill to fall away
automatically if my client signs up a definitive
acquisition agreement with someone else.
In my experience, this fall-away negotiation is
often the most hotly contested negotiation at
this stage of the proceedings. It almost always
seems that the acquiring company's investment
banker insists on a standard fall-away. Lou and
Joel, is there such a thing? Where do you see
things ending up on this issue?
My sense is that, both in auction type situations
and in one-on-one negotiations, when the target
gets a prospective buyer to agree to a standstill,
the prospective buyer typically does not succeed
in adding a fall-away qualification.
But it's clearly easier for a prospective buyer to
negotiate for a fall-away in a one-on-one
negotiation then in a controlled auction.
Lou, as counsel for a target company that has
succeeded in getting a prospective acquiror to
agree to a standstill provision, how much
comfort do you take from the standstill
provision? In other words, even if you succeed
on behalf of your client in getting from the
20021
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LOU KLING:
(Target Counsel)
JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
prospective acquiror a standstill that's very tight,
has no fall-away qualification and stays in effect
for a substantial period of time, do you worry
about its enforceability? What's a Delaware
court likely to do when an unsolicited blow out
offer comes in from a prospective acquiror who
is bound by a standstill? Even though the
making of the offer may be a blatant breach of
the standstill provision, how easy is it going to
be for the target to demonstrate that it has been
damaged by the breach?
As a practical matter, it will be difficult. There
are some cases out there that may be at least
indirectly helpful to target companies on this
point. But target companies still face an uphill
battle.'0
Right. If you were to look at this issue after
another deal were done and the target company
had issued a proxy statement which is required
to contain full disclosure, it would be very hard
to argue that the target or its stockholders had
been damaged by the violation of the standstill.
However, I do believe you still get a fair amount
of comfort from standstill agreements, because
a professional acquiror that is in the market all
the time is going to be reluctant to breach the
standstill intentionally, given that its conduct
will be remembered the next time it's trying to
get into an auction. No acquiror wants that kind
of reputation.
10 Cases involving standstill provisions include: Crane Co. v. Coltec Indus., Inc., 171 F.3d 733
(2d Cir.1999); Emerson Radio Corp. v. Int'l Jensen Inc., 1996 Del. Ch. IEXIS 100 (Del. Ch. 1996);
Crescott Inv. Ass. v. Davis, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 171 (Del. Ch. 1989); In reJ.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d
770 (Del. Ch. 1988) appeal refused, 540 A.2d 1089 (Del. 1988); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Ass., 600 F. Supp.
678 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984); and Mesa Partners
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 488 A.2d 107 (Del. Ch. 1984).
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IMl. EXCLUSIVITY/NO-SHOP AGREEMENT
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
Joel, the final point in your list of responses to
the proposed standstill agreement is a request
that the prospective acquiror get an exclusivity
agreement - a no-shop agreement - from the
target in exchange for agreeing to be bound by
the standstill agreement. Is it typical for a
publicly-held target company to enter into this
sort of stand-alone no-shop agreement (which,
of course, must be distinguished from the no-
solicitation provision in the subsequently
executed definitive merger agreement)? How
often do you request these stand-alone no-shop
agreements when you're representing
prospective acquirors?
Of course, you won't see no-shop agreements as
part of an organized auction because you know
that the target company is dealing with multiple
bidders. That's just part of the game you're
playing. But you will see them requested in the
pure one-on-one strategic deal where the
prospective acquiror is going to invest time and
money in investigating the target company.
They tend to be very short in duration, though.
And the target may well be willing to agree to
limited exclusivity to induce the prospective
acquiror to start the due diligence process. Of
course, the target company knows that
ultimately, if it doesn't like the outcome, it can
just wait until the exclusivity period runs out
and can thereafter pursue other opportunities.
But again, the exclusivity period is typically
pretty short.
That's right, typically a few weeks at most. So
Lou, suppose Joel proffers an agreement in the
form [ofAppendix C] on behalf of a prospective
acquiror. This is a relatively straightforward
two-and-a-half page exclusivity/no-shop
2002]
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LOU KLING:
(Target Counsel)
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
agreement that in effect says to the target
company, we're not even going to invest the
time and effort to do due diligence unless you
give us this. We have to know you're dealing
with us on an exclusive basis. Besides, you
asked for a standstill and we agreed to that. As
counsel to the target company, how do you
react to this? What do you say?
Rick, if the duration of the exclusivity period is
in the range that you mentioned - two, maybe
three weeks - then, depending on what else is
going on, I would have no trouble agreeing to it.
However, I would want to limit the scope ofthe
agreement in ways similar to the ways Joel
sought to limit the standstill provision; for
example, the definition of representatives is too
broad in the version of the no-shop agreement
proffered by Joel. If I'm in the middle of a
process where my client is talking to two
prospective buyers, I'm going to have to judge
what my client is giving up by entering into this
with one of them. Most of the time, I think that
when people enter into exclusivity agreements,
it's because they decide they're not really giving
up anything much anyway - they're really
talking to only one person, and by agreeing to
continue talking only to that one person during
the two or three-week exclusivity period they're
really not giving anything up. But if you're in
an active situation where there are two
motivated and interested people simultaneously
bidding and talking to you, then it becomes a lot
harder to decide what to do.
Lou, when you do advise your client to sign a
relatively short-term exclusivity/no-shop agree-
ment like this, do you ever ask for a fiduciary
out? I see target counsel ask for this from time
to time, and I'm always somewhat surprised
when they do. I assume it means that they don't
fully understand the distinction between a
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stand-alone no-shop agreement with a short,
fixed term and the no-solicitation covenant that
appears in the definitive acquisition agreement,
which is a very different animal.
I agree. Representing the target, I would not ask
for a fiduciary out, because it really undercuts
the whole purpose behind the exclusivity
agreement. The agreement only lasts for a short
period of time and at the end of the day the
target isn't bound to anything one way or the
other, so there's no real need for a fiduciary out.
IV. DEFINITIVE MERGER AGREEMENT - CLOSING CONDITIONS
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
Why don't we turn to the definitive merger
agreement itself and, in particular, to the closing
conditions, which determine the parties' ability
to walk away from the deal after the deal has
been signed up and announced. The acquiring
company's lawyer usually prepares the first draft
of this definitive merger agreement, and we've
included [in Appendix D] the portion of that
draft containing the closing conditions proposed
by the acquiring company's lawyer, Joel
Greenberg. Joel,just to set the stage before we
turn to the specific verbiage of these closing
conditions, what's your mindset as you consider
what these conditions should look like in the
definitive agreement?
Well, my mindset is getting my client, the
acquiror, the benefit of its bargain. You want to
define the closing conditions such that the
acquiror doesn't have to close unless it's getting
at the closing roughly what it expected to get -
a target company that conforms to the
representations and warranties that it made, a
target company that hasn't had a material
deterioration in its business, a target company
whose key executives aren't poised to leave on
the day of the closing and a target company
2002]
232 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:219
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
LOU KLING:
(Target Counsel)
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
Lou KLING:
(Target Counsel)
that's not facing any material legal challenge to
the transaction that might impact the benefit of
the bargain my client thought it negotiated for.
And Lou, the target company's perspective?
The last thing the target wants is to sign up a
deal and have the buyer walk from the deal on
the eve of closing, because this turns the target
into damaged goods. Not only would nobody
else be interested in the target, but it would have
done all kinds of things in terms of passing up
opportunities, in terms ofplacing restrictions on
how it runs its business and in terms of possibly
losing valued employees as a result of the
announcement of the deal. Because the last
thing the target wants is a failed deal, we want to
minimize the buyer's flexibility to walk away
from the deal.
A. Accuracy of Representations Condition
Against that backdrop, let's take a look at some
specific conditions. Please turn to [Appendix
D]. We begin with the accuracy of represen-
tations condition in Section 7.2(a) of the
acquiror's draft. This condition basically pro-
vides that the acquiror need not go forward with
the merger unless the target company's repre-
sentations and warranties were accurate in all
material respects as of the original signing date
and continue to be accurate in all material
respects as brought down to the closing date.
Lou, what are your initial reactions to Joel's
draft of the accuracy of representations condi-
tion? What do you want to change?
Well, the first thing I would ask the buyer is
this: if my client's representations are correct
when we get to the closing, why should it
matter whether or not they were correct back
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when we signed up? Why test the reps
retroactively as of signing, if they're accurate at
closing?
Joel, how do you respond to that? Doesn't Lou
make a pretty convincing argument when he
suggests that a buyer receiving a pristine
company - a company that conforms exactly to
the target's reps and warranties - at closing
shouldn't get a free walk rightjust because some
representation happened to have been
inaccurate two months earlier at the time of the
signing? If the target cures the inaccuracy
before the closing, where's the risk to the buyer?
Rick, I knew you couldn't stay neutral very
long. I would respond to that objection in two
ways. First, there needs to be an incentive for
the target to do its due diligence and make
accurate representations going in. My client,
the buyer, wants there to be a consequence, and
a real one, if the target does a sloppy job. You
want to deter the target from making inaccurate
representations, hoping that it can fix things.
Some targets are incurable optimists. They
think they can fix any problem in the time
period before the closing.
The second way in which I would respond
to Lou's objection is this: If the target presses
the objection, you begin to speculate as to why
it cares that much, because if the target is doing
its job and it's represented by someone like Lou,
it's going to get the representations right at
signing. If the process is done properly, the real
risk isn't that the representations won't be right
at the time they're made. The real risk is that
something will change to make the
representations incorrect as brought down to
the closing.
20021
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RICKCLIMAN:
(Moderator)
JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
LOU KLING:
(Target Counsel)
For what it's worth, a very unscientific survey of
public company deals out there shows that in a
fair number -of the deals - maybe even
approaching half- the representations are tested
only at one point in time, at the closing. What
can we conclude from this? Either acquirors are
being a little more gentle than Joel in what they
initially propose, or target companies are
frequently winning this battle and having this
condition include only a bring-down com-
ponent and not a true-when-made component.
Rick, if you did the same survey, though it's
harder to do, in the private company acquisition
arena, you would find that the double test is by
far the predominant one.
I agree. And yet, particularly in today's
marketplace, where deals are cratering all over
the place in part because of market gyrations
and other related factors, giving a free walk right
to the acquiror is something that most targets -
public and private - are loathe to do.
Lou, what else merits comment here? I
assume the materiality standard is the other big
thingthat you'd want to negotiate in the context
of this particular closing condition.
Yes. As counsel for the target company I would
like to make sure that the acquiror's walk right
arising from inaccurate representations is
appropriately qualified. The concept is this:
whatever inaccuracies exist in the target's reps,
they have to have a material adverse effect for
this condition to be triggered. Now a lot of the
representations themselves will have material
adverse effect qualifiers built in, but there will
be plenty of places where that qualifier won't
appear. In those areas, my reaction would be
that, whether a rep is false or even materially
false shouldn't matter if the inaccuracy doesn't
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have a material adverse effect on the target's
business.
Joel, are acquirors agreeing to include a global
material adverse effect qualification in the
accuracy of representations condition in just
about every deal these days? Has it become the
standard?
Yes. Some form of material adverse effect
qualification has become the standard in the
public company arena. But I wouldn't be very
happy with the formulation that's proposed here
in the target's form [in the proviso to
Section 7.2(a) in Appendix E], because this one
tests every individual inaccuracy to see if it has
a material adverse effect. As a buyer I would
want an individually or in the aggregate test.
And that's something the target undoubtedly
would not object to.
B. No Material Adverse Change Condition
Let's move to the no-material adverse change
condition, the so-called MAC-out, which
appears in Section 7.2(o of the draft proffered
by the acquiring company's lawyer [in Appendix
D]. This condition allows the acquiror to walk,
regardless of whether there's been any breach of
a representation by the target company, if there
has been any material adverse change in the
business, condition, capitalization, assets,
liabilities, operations, financial performance or
prospects of the target since the signing date or
if any event has occurred or any circumstance
exists that could reasonably be expected to result
in a material adverse change at some point in the
future. Lou, is this pretty standard MAC
language? Representing the target, when you
see this, how do you react?
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The primary problem I would have with this
language is its forward-looking nature. This
problem shows up in two places, one of which
is a little more obvious than the other. The
obvious place is the word prospects. As counsel
for the target, I feel the buyer should recognize
that it's buying a business now, and should
make its own judgment about those future
prospects. My client doesn't want to be
responsible for ensuring that the buyer's vision
of the future can be sustained.
The other, less obvious forward-looking
aspect of Joel's language is events having
occurred that could reasonably be expected to
result in a future material adverse change. That
too is forward-looking. It requires some event
today, but the consequences could be way down
the road.
But the consequences could also be
tomorrow.
Yes.
And there's the tension. You could have, for
example, a federal regulation that's going to take
effect in a few days and shut down the target's
entire business.
Or the key customer that cancels its big order
for next year.
So what do you do to compromise on this point,
Joel? Do you usually insist on the forward-
looking language as you've drafted it [in
Appendix D]? I assume that it depends in part
on the nature of the target company and its
business.
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I think it depends a lot on just that. In some
cases, you're in a pure prospects play, particular-
ly in your part of the world, Rick - in the
Silicon Valley where the target company may
have nothing but technology and high
expectations for the future.
Yes, the classic example is a biotech company,
with a pipeline of products awaiting govern-
mental approval and a business that's not
generating any revenue now. All the acquiror is
buying, at least arguably, is future prospects.
That's right. Ultimately, in cases not involving
a pure prospects play, I think most buyers
would be prepared to move away from a
concept of purely undefined prospects, but
would still try to get language that incorporates
some concept of proximate future impact of
events that have already occurred.
I agree with that.
So, Lou, let's assume you've compromised on
the forward-looking elements of the MAC-out.
Let's talk about negotiated carve-outs from the
definition of material adverse change. Ifwe take
a look at the response you've provided on behalf
of the target company [in Appendix E] here,
we'll see a definition of target material adverse
effect. It says, 'target material adverse effect'
means any change or effect that is materially
adverse to the business, financial condition or
results of operations of the target and its
subsidiaries - no forward-looking language
there - taken as a whole. Then the definition
continues with a lengthy proviso: provided,
however, that none of the following shall be
deemed ... to constitute ... a target material
adverse effect. The list of excluded items is a
long one - changes in stock price, failure to
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meet internal projections, conditions affecting
the target's industry generally, conditions
affecting the economy generally, things that
arise from the announcement or pendency of
the deal, actions required to be taken under
applicable laws and regulations and changes in
accounting principles. It's quite an impressive
list of carve-outs. Lou, which of these do you
actually propose with a straight face, and which
of these are just sort of novelty items?
(Laughter)
Well, I think what you seriously propose is
carving out the things that affect the economy
or the industry generally. And you need to give
some serious thought to how that actually works
in practice, particularly if there is an issue of
defining the industry or there's an issue of
whether something hits the target differently
from other players in that industry. But
basically you always look to get those two carve-
outs.
The carve-out for things that result from
the deal or the deal announcement is something
that target companies should certainly try to get,
again particularly if the target is in the high-tech
sector where there are some obvious and
potentially serious negative consequences that
announcing a deal may very well have.
Like nervous employees heading for the exits.
Right. To be honest, that's pretty much as far as
I would go with a straight face.
And, Joel, when a target proposes a carve-out
from the MAC definition for things arising
from the announcement or pendency of the
deal, do you roll over on that one? Or is that a
carve-out you find tough to give as counsel for
the acquiror?
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Well, it's a carve-out that's given a lot, and you
have to recognize that. But it has some real
traps in it, which go to the practical application
of the provision. It's tough enough for a buyer
to determine whether any particular event has a
material adverse effect on the target right before
closing, when the buyer is trying to decide
whether to walk from the deal. But you really
put the buyer in a tough position if you have
layered on top of that the notion that if, after the
fact, someone can identify a causal connection,
or at least argue one, between the pendency of
the transaction and the adverse effect, the
buyer's decision to walk can be challenged.
Assume, for example, that the target loses a
major customer between the signing and
scheduled closing, and from my client's
perspective as a buyer, it's not getting what it
expected. If the announcement or pendency of
the deal carve-out is in the definitive merger
agreement, then the seller could argue, after the
fact when we're in court, well, that customer
only left because it doesn't like the buyer.
From the buyer's point of view, this adds
further uncertainty to an already uncertain area.
So I think this carve-out is something that's
definitely worth talking about and trying to
eliminate or narrow. Nonetheless, it often finds
its way into the final agreement in some form.
You can come up with plenty of other scenarios
where the target company could use this carve-
out to its advantage. For example, if the target
company badly misses its earnings and revenue
targets in the pre-closing period, the target
company will always be able to say, well, that's
because of the announcement of the deal. With
the deal pending, our employees were distracted
and concerned about their jobs and that's what
led to the financial deterioration.
What we're sometimes seeing as a
compromise on this point is language
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attempting to tighten up the causal nexus that's
required to bring the carve-out into play. You
might see verbiage to the effect that an adverse
change arising from the announcement of a deal
won't be a MAC if it arises directly and
proximately from the announcement. At least
in the minds of some lawyers, that sort of
language should make the carve-out more
palatable to the buyer.
Can I ask you a question?
Sure.
It would seem to me that it's pretty dicey to
advise your client to walk in a lot of these
circumstances because of the open-ended
contextual aspect of the issues. It seems to me
that, litigation being so fact intensive, you're
buying a lawsuit where the outcome is very,
very hard to predict because it is all about facts
and it all depends on how the issue comes up,
what court it comes up in and who's the
plaintiff and who's the defendant.
And Lou, isn't that exactly what you're trying to
accomplish when you're representing the target
company? Isn't it your job, as the target
company's lawyer, to create enough in the way
of issues and uncertainties to ensure that an
acquiror will never have the guts to invoke the
MAC-out, in light of the draconian liability that
it will be facing if it ends up declaring a MAC to
support its exercise of a walk right, only to have
some court (which may not be as sophisticated
as the Delaware Chancery Court or the
Delaware Supreme Court) concluding, with the
benefit of hindsight, that no MAC occurred.
Isn't that really the name of the game: to
paralyze and confuse the enemy - the acquiror
- that way?
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Yes, that's exactly right.
And I think from the buyer's perspective you
have to start from the proposition that even the
unadorned MAC provision, without the
exceptions, has a tendency to paralyze and
confuse. One of the tasks for an acquiror's
lawyer is to make the issue absolutely clear to
his client, so that the client does not have an
unrealistic expectation about what a MAC-out
actually gives the client. That's why, in
situations where there are known contingencies
to worry about, the parties may try to negotiate
specific remedies relating to those contingencies
outside the MAC condition.
Some of the case law in this area is scary. The
decisions interpreting MAC clauses are all over
the lot, and some of the cases were quite clearly
decided by judges that are not familiar or
comfortable with the finer points of M&A deals
and acquisition agreements. Joel, I know you
frequently talk about the Texas case relating to
the radio station, which is remarkable....
It really is remarkable. There is an appellate
decision floating around out there in Texas
which holds that a catastrophic decline in the
ratings of a radio station was not a material
adverse change because the station still had its
license and was still transmitting." The court
11 Borders v. KLRB, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 57 (Tex.Civ.App. 1987). Other decisions interpreting
MAC clauses and similar clauses include: In re IBP S'holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., Consol. CA.
No. 18373, Strine (Del. Ch.June 2001); Pacheco v. Cambridge Tech. Partners (Mass.), Inc., 85 F. Supp.
2d 69 (D. Mass. 2000); Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 482 (W.D. Pa. 1999), afld
216 F.3d 1075 (3rd Cir. 2000); Pine St. Creamery Co. v. Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc., 1999 U.S. App.
LEGS 31529 (4th Cir. N.C. Dec. 2, 1999); Georgia-Pacific v. GAF RoofingMfg. Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEUS 5816 (S.D.N.Y 1997); Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 175 B.R. 438 (S.D.N.Y 1994); Bear
Stearns v. Jardine Strategic Holdings, 161 A.D.2d 297 (S.C.N.Y. 1990); Raskin v. Birmingham Steel
Corp., 1990 Del. Ch. LEXS 194 (1990); Esplanade Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Templeton Energy Income Corp.,
889 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1989); Northern Heel Corp. v. Compo Indus., Inc., 851 F.2d 456 (1st Cir. 1988);
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chose to overlook one small problem - nobody
was listening. (Laughter)
What I tell my clients is that a MAC isn't
equivalent to a do-over. A buyer may say, after
learning about a problem with the target
company on the eve of closing, I would have
agreed to pay 10% less for this company if I had
known about this problem. That may well be
true, but that doesn't necessarily get you out
under a MAC clause.
And you'll also find that executives with
financial, and in particular accounting, training
will sometimes think that a MAC is the
equivalent of something that would lead you to
believe that financial statements aren't fairly
presented. But it's far from that.
I think we've all been in the uncomfortable
situation of attempting to advise a client as to
whether a particular development constitutes a
MAC. At the end of the day, it's got to be
something pretty close to catastrophic before
you can comfortably advise a client to walk away
and face the potentially horrendous liability
associated with making the wrong call on that
issue.
Rick, one quick question. Why do you think
that lawyers for buyers don't try and draft more
specifically? Why is it that they try and preserve
this vagueness as opposed to saying, look, these
five things will trigger a walk-away?
Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Katz v. NVF Co., 100A.D.2d
470 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Gordon v. Dolin, 105 Il. App. 3d 319 (1982); KLRA, Inc. v. Long, 6 Ark.
App. 125 (1982); Peoria Say. and Loan Assoc. v. American Say. Assoc., 109 Ill. App. 3d 1043 (1982);
Auble v. Sprosty, 1977 Ohio App. LEXIS 9304 (1977); Pittsburgh Coke & Chem. Co. v. Bollo, 421 F.
Supp. 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); and Rudman v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 35 A.D.2d 213 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1970).
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Good question. Representing buyers I often do
just that. Certainly if you take a look at recent
agreements, particularly in the technology arena,
you will see buyers becoming increasingly
precise in defining their walk rights, while still
preserving the more general right to walk away
for unforeseen and undefined catastrophic
events. Obviously the target companies resist
this tendency toward specificity because these
carefully crafted walk rights create a much more
objective standard and provide a much less risky
opportunity for an acquiror to walk away under
specified circumstances.
Although I think, as a buyer, one thing I might
worry about a little bit in defining what the
triggering events are is whether I've totally put
the nail in the coffin for any event I didn't list.
These issues are tough ones, and our discussion
today is particularly timely. There's a pending
lawsuit, filed a couple of months ago, relating to
the termination of the NorthPoint
Communications/Verizon Communications
deal, where Verizon called a MAC on
NorthPoint and used that to justify walking
away.'2 NorthPoint claimed that there was no
MAC and that Verizon accordingly had no right
to walk - hence the litigation. It will be
interesting to see how that case shakes out.
You generally see an increase in deal
terminations in the context of a volatile stock
market like the one we've seen recently. I
predict we'll see more litigation in this area over
the next year or so. It will be very interesting to
see what direction these cases take, particularly
when sophisticated tribunals like the Delaware
courts tackle them.1
3
12 NorthPoint Communications Group, Inc. v.Verizon Communications, Inc. (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Case No. 317249, complaint filed Dec. 8, 2000).
13 In re IBP S'holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., Consol. CA. No. 18373, Strine (Del. Ch.June
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Just two additional questions on MACs
before we move on. First of all, Joel, I noticed
in the acquiror's draft [in Appendix D], in
Section 7.3, you've actually provided a MAC-
out going in the other direction. You've
provided, in clause (d) of Section 7.3, that the
target company can walk if there is a material
adverse change in the acquiror's business. Are
you being overly generous here? Is this typical?
Does it depend at all on the pricing formulation
in the deal?
It depends a lot on the pricing formulation and
the nature of the consideration being paid by the
buyer. Obviously, if the buyer is paying cash,
there's not going to be a MAC-out in favor of
the target. If it's paying in its stock as in our
hypothetical example, it depends on the nature
of the exchange ratio, and whether you've got
other mechanisms to treat massive changes in
the business of the buyer. For example, if
you've got an uncollared fixed dollar value
(floating) exchange ratio, so that the target's
stockholders are going to get the same dollar
value no matter how far the acquiror's business
goes into the tank, I think as a buyer you've got
a very strong argument that a MAC-out is not
appropriate.
One last questions on MACs. During the deal
frenzy of the first half of 2000, when acquisition
targets often possessed an extraordinary amount
of negotiating leverage, I was fielding calls from
some of my friends in the investment banking
community asking can you get me some good
examples of publicly announced hell or high
water deals where the buyer doesn't have any
MAC-out at all - in other words, deals where,
once the definitive agreement is signed and
2001).
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announced, the transaction is ultimately going
to close, come hell or high water. And I was
unable to find more than a small handful of
such deals. Joel and Lou, were you regularly
seeing deals like that last year? At least in
situations where the acquiring company didn't
have the deal locked up with voting agreements
or other effectively preclusive lock-ups, did we
ever get to the point where deals were routinely
done without MAC-outs at all?
I think historically those deals have been very
rare, even as a quid pro quo for a lock-up.
I agree. They're very unusual.
C. No Litigation Condition
Let's move to the acquiror's litigation out in
Section 7.2(g) of the acquiror's draft [Appendix
D]. It gives the acquiror a walk right in the
event of pending or threatened litigation relating
to the proposed deal. Joel, as a threshold
matter, why does the acquiror need a separate
litigation out at all? Why doesn't the acquiror
get the protection it needs from the bring-down
of the target company's litigation representation
- the rep that says there's no pending or
threatened litigation against the target company?
Well, it really depends on what that represen-
tation says, and we haven't reproduced it here.
But typically the representation that you would
get from a target would simply relate to
litigation against the target itself. It would not,
for example, include deal-related litigation
against the acquiror, and that's why the acquiror
wants a separate litigation condition. The
acquiror needs a right to walk if it gets sued over
the deal - by the antitrust authorities for
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example - even if the target isn't named in the
suit.
Lou, representing the target, how do you react
to this litigation out, assuming that we're not
dealing with a hell-or-high-water deal in which
you have the business leverage to eliminate the
condition in its entirety? Joel has served up a
broad litigation out that covers both pending
and threatened litigation by any party -
governmental or private - challenging the deal.
How do you attempt to cut it back?
Well, the most important thing that I would try
to do to this would be to limit it to litigation
brought by a governmental agency. In other
words I would try to eliminate from the
condition private party litigation, so my client
wouldn't have to worry about strike suits
brought by the plaintiffs' bar. We all know that
litigation challenging deals is a fact of life, so
that's something that I'm not going to want to
have trigger a walk right for the buyer, whether
it's merely threatened or actually out there. So
the first thing I'm going to do is to try to limit
the coverage of this condition to litigation
brought by governmental authorities.
I'm probably also going to try to limit the
condition's coverage to actual pending litigation
and exclude mere threats, on the theory that
threats are very hard to police and a threat may
or may not be serious. I'd rather have a bright-
line test that there actually be litigation filed and
commenced.
The last thing I'd probably do is try to
tighten up some of the consequences that are
listed here by adding materiality qualifiers. And,
particularly in a one-step deal like the
hypothetical deal we're discussing, I probably
wouldn't want the buyer to walk unless the
pending governmental litigation in question has
a material adverse effect. I might even take a
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shot at redrafting the condition to provide that
any material adverse effect determination is
made by reference to the combined business of
both companies together. But that might be
pushing things a bit too far.
I see you've done a very good job on all fronts in
Section 7.2(o of the target company's response
[inAppendixE]. There shall not be pending- no
reference to threatened - against the acquiror,
before any U.S. federal or state court.... any suit,
action or proceeding challenging the merger
commenced by any U.S. federal or state governmental
body in which there is a reasonable likelihood of a
judgment against the acquiror providing for an
award of damages or other relief that would
have an acquiror material adverse effect. So
you've built in multiple layers of protection for
the target here. Joel, what's the buyer's
reaction?
While I would have a great deal of sympathy for
some of Lou's points, I think Lou's response
goes a little too far. I do agree with Lou in that
I honestly find it hard to argue that threatened
or even pendingprivate litigation should give my
client an out. As Lou said, litigation is a way of
life in this country. However, as far as threatened
government litigation is concerned, I don't
know how many of us would be prepared to
force the Antitrust Division to actually commence
a lawsuit, as opposed to merely telling the
parties they're going to do it. I think most of us
would view that as a sufficiently credible threat
that a buyer should be able to reassess the deal
at that point.
I also have some concern about how to
measure and define the consequences of the
litigation. I'm glad Lou was willing to
acknowledge -that measuring the materiality of
the litigation by reference to the size of the
buyer in addition to the target is a bit much.
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You have to look at the consequences in a very
context-driven way. If you're looking to buy the
entire business of the target, almost any level of
divestiture, for example, would be a
consequence that troubles you.
The reasonable likelihood standard built
into Lou's provision [in Appendix E] is also
problematic, because at the time we have to
assess this, all there will be to evaluate is a
complaint. There will have been no motion
practice, no discovery. There will merely be a
complaint that seeks a remedy, and by definition
it must have been filed by a U.S. governmental
body.
And that ought to be enough?
And that ought to be enough. I do think you
have to be very careful, on both sides, in
defining what particular governmental bodies
count. Lou's draft [in Appendix E] says U.S.
federal or state governmental body, which may
make sense in a purely domestic deal. But in a
multinational transaction, a target can't so
readily insist on that limitation. In many deals,
a challenge by the European Union would be of
concern. On the other hand, I don't think a
buyer should be able to walk because some
governmental authority in a country in which
the parties do one-tenth of 1% of their sales
volume tries to attack the transaction.
Right. There's a certain trade-off between this
issue and the materiality issue. Once the target
gives up on a materiality standard, so that any
governmental litigation - no matter how insign-
ificant - can trigger the buyer's walk right, the
target is going to want to define jurisdictionally,
perhaps geographically, the types of litigation
that are going to be deemed significant enough
to allow the acquiror a way out.
NEGOTIATING ACQUISITIONS
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What's the relationship between Section 7.2(f
and the general accuracy of representations
condition in Section 7.2(a), which generally will
bring down the target's no-litigation
representation?
Sam, what you have to bear in mind - and Joel
alluded to this earlier - is that the typical
litigation representation made by the target
company covers only litigation against the target
company itself But the acquiror may well want
the right to walk if there is a lawsuit challenging
the deal that names the acquiror as the defendant
but doesn't also name the target company. The
bring-down of the target's litigation rep, at least
if it's a standard litigation rep, won't cover
litigation against the acquiring company.
Actually, a lot of the time when we're advising
the target, we try to exclude deal-related litigation
against the target from the target's litigation rep,
on the theory that, at the time we're making the
representation there isn't going to be any deal-
related litigation and, for purposes of a closing,
this type of litigation will be dealt with in a
separate closing condition. We don't want to
muddy up the waters by having to worry about
the litigation representation covering this
separately when it gets brought down to the
closing.
Lou's point is very important because he could
have, for example, negotiated a closing condi-
tion that talks only about government litigation,
and then have to argue about whether private,
deal-related litigation against the target gives the
20021 249
250 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:219
CHIEFJUSTICE VEASEY:
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
CHIEFJUSTICEVEASEY:
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
CHIEF JUSTICE VEASEY:
buyer a separate walk right by virtue of the
bring-down of the target's litigation rep.
I have a stupid question.
I doubt it's stupid.
You're talking a lot about deal-related litigation.
How about other litigation? Does that fall
under material adverse consequences? Suppose
the target company's crown jewel is some
proprietary patent and there's meritorious
litigation challenging the validity of the patent?
Because that litigation will be brought against
the target, it will be covered by the bring-down
of the target company's litigation representation.
That representation will say that there is no
material pending or threatened litigation against
the target company. Pursuant to Section 7.2(a),
the accuracy of representations condition, that's
going to get tested at the closing. So if there's
been material patent litigation brought against
the target between signing and closing, and it's
still pending at the time of closing, the buyer
may be able to kill the deal by invoking Section
7.2(a), the bring-down condition. Of course, if
Lou has his way, to invoke that condition the
buyer will have to overcome a material adverse
effect hurdle or some other comparably high
materiality hurdle.
And, if Lou really has his way, the target's
litigation rep will be dated, so that it doesn't get
brought down at all.
Rick and Lou, let me ask you this question.
This is a public company negotiation, which
involves the directors' duty of care. In how
much detail do you take the board through the
NEGOTIATING ACQUISITIONS
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conditions section of the definitive acquisition
agreement?
Let me set the stage for responding to that
question, and then I'll turn it over to Lou. In a
public company stock-for-stock merger, where
there is never any post-closing indemnification,
issues relating to walk rights are among the most
important issues in the deal, along with price
and deal protection issues. Regardless of
whether I'm on the buy side or on the target
side, I tend to spend - and I assume most
lawyers who deal regularly with public company
boards likewise tend to spend - a good amount
of time in the board meetings talking specifically
about the parties' walk rights.
Most target company boards recognize that
an acquiror who finds a way to walk is going to
leave the target company high and dry - as
damaged goods, with employees and customers
poised tojump ship or at least very nervous, and
with dim prospects of returning any time soon
to the position it was in before the deal was
announced. What I emphasize in my
presentations to the target company's board is
that you have to look ahead and assume that the
acquiring company may decide to walk for a
reason that's unrelated to the particular
condition it's invoking. During the period
between signing and closing, an acquiring
company can develop an entirely new agenda -
it can become disenchanted with a target
company for reasons having nothing to do with
the target company itself, and can be looking for
an excuse to walk away. So it's not enough for
a target company's board to convince itself, "oh,
they would never walk away because of some
trivial piece of litigation threatened in some far-
offjurisdiction." You have to assume that the
acquiring company may be in a position of
wanting to walk away for some entirely
independent reason and turning its litigators
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LOU KLING:
(Target Counsel)
loose to look for holes in the acquisition
agreement.
I couldn't agree more. Generally, discussions
with the board these days focus first on potential
third party bids and related deal protection
matters, and second on walk rights. Those two
things account for 90% of what you talk about
in those board meetings.
V. DEFINITIVE MERGER AGREEMENT - DEAL PROTECTION
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
Let's turn now to some of the deal protection
measures in the definitive acquisition agree-
ment. These are the provisions that come into
play if a third party makes a competing, or
topping, bid to acquire the target company
between signing and closing. And, of course,
the acquiror's intent in including these deal
protection provisions is to discourage third
parties from making such competing bids in the
first instance.
A. No-Solicitation/No-Talk Covenant
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
The first deal protection provision we'll focus
on today is the target company's no-solicitation/
no-talk covenant in the definitive merger agree-
ment. Remember, this is different from the
stand-alone exclusivity agreement that we
discussed earlier. That agreement is a stand-
alone document with a short, finite term that is
put into place several days or weeks before the
definitive merger agreement is hammered out.
By contrast, what we're going to be focusing on
now is a covenant that doesn't go into effect
until the final, definitive merger agreement is
actually signed.
If you take a look at [Appendix F], you'll see
that the acquiror's form of no-solicitation/no-
talk covenant appears in Section 6.3 of the
definitive merger agreement. Joel, why don't
NEGOTIATING ACQUISITIONS
JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
you walk us through this covenant and tell us
how it works. In particular, why do you feel
compelled to offer up a fiduciary exception to
the no-talk prong of this provision?
First of all, the way the provision works is that
there is a very short and absolute statement of
an operative ban - it's the first part of Section
6.3(a) - which basically obligates the target in
very strong terms not to try to stir up or
encourage any competing transaction. That's
followed by a series of exceptions and
definitions and some procedural rules. The big
exception is the fiduciary out which occupies
about two-thirds of paragraph (a), and permits
the target board to conclude, after going
through some procedures, including obtaining
advice of counsel, that it would be a breach of
its fiduciary duty to fail to respond to a superior
proposal. If the board reaches that conclusion,
it can furnish information to the third party that
made the superior proposal, so long as certain
conditions are satisfied. These conditions
include obtaining confidentiality agreements
and satisfying a notification and continuing
updating requirement contained in
paragraph (b).
You asked why an acquiror would proffer a
fiduciary out in its first draft. I think the reason
is two-fold. First, it's going to wind up there
anyway, because any target is going to ask for it
and it's common practice to give it in some
form; and I'd prefer to start negotiating from a
form of fiduciary out that I like, not the target's
overbroad form. Second, I'm not sure as a
buyer I particularly like the idea of having a no-
solicitation/no-talk provision without a fiduciary
out, because then the courts are going to create
their own fiduciary out for the target. At least
this way you have some hope that you can
confine the court's discretion.
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RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
LOU KLING:
(Target Counsel)
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
Lou, you've provided the target's company's re-
write of this provision [in Appendix G]. What
are the hot issues?
I think every lawyer would probably rank these
a little differently. But the most important one
in my view is this: What is it that a third party
must do to get my client, the target company,
out from under this tough set of restrictions. In
Joel's formulation [in Appendix F], the third
party must have made a superior proposal. In
the target's formulation [in Appendix G], I've
changed that to something which is reasonably
likely to result in a superior proposal. To my
mind, that's the most important change.
Looking at it from the target's perspective, how
can somebody actually make a superior proposal
without getting the information they need to
make it? So Joel's formulation creates a
situation where you hamstring the third party to
an inappropriate degree. The third party needs
information to come up with its proposal,
which may ultimately be a better proposal. But
until the third party comes up with a better
proposal, the target isn't permitted to give the
third party any information or talk to the third
party, according toJoel's circular provision. We
need to fix that provision.
But Lou, isn't a sophisticated prospective
acquiror going to know how to play the game?
Won't it simply put together a written proposal
that has the right numbers in it and the right
language in it, all subject, of course, to
conducting a satisfactory due diligence
investigation, which makes the proposal
completely non-binding? This could still be a
superior proposal even under Joel's narrow
definition. Why do you really need to fight
about those words when a third-party interloper
that knows what it's doing can get your client
where it wants to get?
NEGOTIATING ACQUISITIONS
LOU KLING:
(Target Counsel)
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
There are two reasons, and I think that they are
both very important from the target's perspec-
tive. The first is that a large number of ac-
quirors might not be willing to do that.
Acquirors don't like putting proposals on the
table and then walking away from them; it hurts
their reputation and it hurts their credibility in
their next deal. Remember, all of this is being
played out in a fairly public arena. So I don't
think it's necessarily true that a lot of potential
buyers will, in fact, put a high number on the
table subject to due diligence just to get in the
door and look at information.
The second reason is that the language
could have subtle implications for purposes of
the buyer's termination right and right to
receive a break-up fee. If the target's board has
con-cluded that something is actually a superior
proposal, that may in fact trigger all kinds of
termination rights and fees at a point where the
target doesn't have any firm deal with the third
party - at a point where the target hasn't even
given the third party any information. If on the
other hand my client's board can give the third
party information without reaching that
conclusion, but rather by merely reaching a
conclusion that the board thinks there is a
reasonable shot at a superior proposal, that in
most instances is not going to trigger any of the
buyer's termination rights or rights to receive
fees.
Joel, do you give in on this one easily?
Ultimately, yes, because I don't think you're
going to be able to tie the target up so tightly
that it can't respond in some way to unsolicited
inquiries that seem to be credible. And if you
write it in the tighter form [as in Appendix F],
you're encouraging either outright evasion or
the games that you talked about from the
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RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
LOU KLING:
(Target Counsel)
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
CHIEFJUSTICEVEASEY:
competing bidder. Of course, as a buyer you do
need to focus on the break-up fee triggers for
the reasons Lou indicated.
Lou, what else do you fight about here?
Well, you fight about, for example, whether the
target is going to have an absolute obligation to
make its employees and investment bankers
behave themselves or whether it's just going to
be required to use its reasonable efforts to keep
them in line. You also fight over whether the
board has to make its decision about invoking
the fiduciary exception based on the advice of
counsel, as opposed to after receipt of advice from
counsel, as opposed to based on an opinion from
counsel, as opposed to based on a written opinion
from counsel.
Why don't we stop there for a second. Even the
buyer-oriented language initially proffered by
Joel [in Appendix F], as counsel to the acquiror,
doesn't actually require a written opinion or any
opinion at all for that matter. It just says that
the board's determination that its fiduciary
duties require it to start talking to another
bidder has to be based on advice from outside
counsel.
Doesn't that relate to the Capital Re14 case where
Vice Chancellor Strine observed that a based
upon standard could be problematic in certain
litigation contexts? Is that an important issue
from an economic point of view now, or do
buyers just cave on that and go with the more
lenient after receipt of advice standard proposed
by the target company [in Appendix G]?
14 Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999).
NEGOTIATING ACQUISITIONS
LOU KLING:
(Target Counsel)
CHIEF JUSTICE VEASEY:
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
CHIEF JUSTICE VEASEY:
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
I don't think it is economically important, and
after Capital Re I would worry about requiring
that the board's decision be based upon outside
legal advice, because I think the Vice Chancellor
suggested that could be an abdication of the
board's fiduciary duty to make its own
decisions.
That may or may not be a correct decision, but
it is something to think about.
And it is indeed worth taking a close look at that
Capital Re decision, which was issued only last
year. Vice Chancellor Strine suggested that the
narrowly drawn language, "based on the written
advice of its outside legal counsel," does not
preclude the board of directors from concluding
that it must deal with a potential third party
bidder, even if outside counsel equivocates and
gives qualified advice.
And counsel did equivocate in that case.
As a more general matter, does the specific
language used in this provision really matter? In
addition to requesting that the words based on
be changed to after receipt of, Lou is requesting
other language changes [in Appendix G] that
might look trivial to an outside observer. For
example, Lou is looking to change the required
showing from "would result in" to "creates a
reasonable possibility of constituting" a breach
of fiduciary duty. To what extent does this
language even matter in light of a case like
Capital Re? Can youjust assume that no matter
what language you put in here, it will get
construed in a way that doesn't have the board
improperly abdicating its fiduciary duties? Do
you really need to fight about this stuff?
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JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
CHIEF JUSTICE VEASEY:
JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
I think the law is sufficiently unsettled that to
some extent you don't know today whether it
makes a difference. We got some guidance from
Vice Chancellor Strine on the specific issue of
the nature of the legal advice that has to be
given, but we have nojudicial guidance on some
of these other determinations. We just don't
know.
I think when you're dealing with an area where
the law is unsettled, as in this area, you have to
start in your analysis from the point of the
worst-case scenario. Let's assume that the court
will conduct a searching inquiry. What then?
These cases often come up in the worst possible
context for the acquiror. It won't be someone
challenging the language in a vacuum, but a real
third party out there who wants to give the
target company's stockholders more value.
You're going to be faced with the unenviable
prospect of trying to convince ajudge that this
contract should be construed in a way that
prevents the board from responding to that
third party's overtures.
B. Recommendation Covenant
Against that backdrop, let's take a quick look at
another, related deal protection provision
included in the definitive merger agreement.
That's the covenant of the target company's
board of directors to recommend the contem-
plated merger to the target company's
stockholders. If you look at [Appendix H],
you'll see the acquiror's form of recommenda-
tion covenant. This is a fairly strong covenant
that requires the acquired company's board of
directors to recommend and continue to recom-
mend this deal unless - and this is a limited
fiduciary exception that looks something like
NEGOTIATING ACQUISITIONS
Lou KLING:
(Target Counsel)
the exception we just discussed - a superior
proposal, as narrowly defined, comes along.
Lou, as counsel for the target company,
what reaction do you have to the recommenda-
tion covenant proffered by Joel? I noticed in
your response in [Appendix I], you've deleted
entirely the superior proposal requirement in
the fiduciary exception. You've in effect said,
look, if the board determines for any reason that
its fiduciary duties require it to pull its
recommendation and to recommend against
doing this merger, the board ought to have the
flexibility to do that, whether or not there's a
'superior proposal' on the table.
Why don't you begin by giving some
examples of situations where there is no
superior proposal on the table, but where the
target company's board might nonetheless
determine that its fiduciary duties require it to
withdraw its recommendation of the original
deal.
Well, the best example gets back to the material
adverse change situation we talked about before.
You can have a situation where the exchange
ratio in the merger is fixed, and there's been an
adverse change in the acquiring company's
business that really drives down the dollar value
of the deal to the target's stockholders, who will
be receiving stock of the acquiror in the merger.
As the target's counsel you may not feel
sufficiently comfortable that this is actually a
material adverse change for purposes of
triggering a walk right, and your client may not
wish to take the liability risk of declaring a MAC
and walking. At the same time, the board may
no longer believe the deal as originally priced
makes sense. That's a perfect example of a
situation where I would find it very hard to tell
a board of directors, Even though you don't
believe in this deal any more, you have to mail
out a proxy statement that says you're still
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RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
CHIEFJUSTICEVEASEY:
recommending it. I don't even know how you
get up and say that to the board and expect to
get hired again. (Laughter) If they don't believe
in it, they don't believe in it.
Although there is a way technically to get
around that problem that's been tried
before....
That's the Zions Bancorp situation, where the
board sent out a supplement to its proxy
statement which on its face didn't do anything
to undercut its recommendation of the deal, but
basically said our financial advisor has now
concluded that this is a terrible deal for
stockholders (Laughter) - Goldman Sachs
having been nice enough to pull its fairness
opinion - and then proceeded to explain in great
detail why the deal was so terr'ible, as I think
they were required to do by the proxy rules and
their duty of candor.' s
Isn't that the real problem here, that this
particular provision implicates one of the
broadest and most fundamental of the fiduciary
duties of directors - the duty of candor, the duty
to make full disclosure? As a director, it's very
tough to be put into a situation where you're
contractually forced to continue recommending
a deal that you think is a bad deal, unless you're
prepared to make public disclosures that
completely vitiate the recommendation.
And the statute changed and changed the whole
atmosphere there, I suppose. Section 251 of the
DGCL says you can pull your recommendation.
is Zions Bancorporation proxy statement supplement dated March. 15, 2000 to proxy
statement/prospectus dated February 17, 2000.
NEGOTIATING ACQUISITIONS
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
LOU KLING:
(Target Counsel)
And in the several years since Section 251 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law has been
amended to allow a merger to be brought to
stockholders for a vote even in the face of a
negative board recommendation, we've seen so-
called force-the-vote provisions become quite
prevalent in stock-for-stock merger agreements.
We'll have more to say about that a little later.
Rick, I think that's one of the reasons why the
action has shifted away from the precise nature
of the recommendation covenant, since it's
always been subject to a duty of candor as well
as a duty of disclosure under the federal proxy
rules, to a question of whether you can force the
target to take the deal to the stockholders even
if the board changes its mind.
But just to get some calibration on current
practice, Lou, in the recommendation covenant
in the definitive merger agreement, to what
extent are you typically seeing a fiduciary
exception conditioned on an actual superior
proposal having been made [as in Appendix H],
as opposed to a more general and broader
fiduciary out [as in Appendix I] that would
permit a change of recommendation without a
competing bid on the table - in the context of
striking gold on the target's property or a
material adverse change to the acquiring
company's business, for example.
I would say that in the larger transactions, I tend
to see the board's right to withdraw its
recommendation more often still tied to a
superior proposal, although what I said before is
actually what I personally believe - that the
superior proposal requirement is not the right
formulation. But it's still the most common.
I think the least common formulation is kind of
cutting the baby, which allows the target board
to pull its recommendation if they believe
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RICKCLIMAN:
(Moderator)
JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
there's been a material adverse development in
the acquiror's business. That formulation does
not cover the situation where there's been a
positive development in the target's own
business - the striking gold scenario you
mentioned. And the target generally wants to
provide for that.
The second most common formulation is
the way we have it in [Appendix I] - a very broad
fiduciary exception that contractually allows the
board to pull its recommendation if its fiduciary
duty requires it to pull it, whether it's because of
something bad in the acquiror's business,
something good in the target's own business or
a third party coming along and making an
attractive competing bid.
C. Break-Up Fees
Let's move from the recommendation covenant
to the acquiror's form oftermination and break-
up fee provisions, included in [Appendix J].
Joel, why don't you walk us through your draft
of these buyer-oriented termination provisions
and break-up fee provisions.
Sure. We've obviously included only a few of
the termination provisions you generally see,
but the ones we've included implicate deal
protection issues of the kind we've been talking
about. The first of the termination clauses that
we've included provides for a drop-dead date.
If the transaction doesn't close by the specified
date, for any reason, either party can walk. The
second provides that, if you go to the target's
stockholders and they don't approve the
transaction - they vote it down - at that point
either party can terminate. And the third one,
and the one which is the most controversial of
the three we've highlighted, provides a
termination right that's unilateral to the
acquiror, giving the acquiror the right to walk
NEGOTIATING ACQUISITIONS
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
away if any triggering event has occurred.
Triggering event is defined very broadly [in
AppendixJ] to include any lack of enthusiasm on
the part of the target board for the deal, no
matter how manifested. And in this acquirior-
favorable formulation, that lack of enthusiasm
gives the acquiror, but not the target, the ability
to make a choice: Do we want to go forward
and force the deal to be considered and voted
upon by the target's stockholders, or do we
want to walk at this point and collect a break-up
fee?
So, just to be crystal clear on this: if you take a
look at Section 8.1(e) [in AppendixJ], it says that
this agreement can be terminated by the
acquiror if there is a triggering event, which is
an event that shows a lack of support for the
deal on the part of the target's board of
directors. It is a unilateral walk right, effectively
providing the acquiror with a force-the-vote
option. The target, even if it satisfies the
requirements for having its board of directors
withdraw its recommendation of the deal,
cannot terminate the deal at this point. It has to
take the deal to a vote of its stockholders, if the
acquiror so chooses.
In some deals, the acquiror's walk right is
not unilateral, and the agreement includes a
comparable termination provision allowing the
target to walk. You'll see this in the target's
response [in Appendix K], where Section 8.1(e)
is a bilateral termination right - either party can
invoke it. The target's termination right in this
context is sometimes referred to as a fiduciary
termination right, and deals that incorporate
that provision don't give the acquiror the ability
to force the vote.
The particular provisions we're looking at
[in AppendixJ] are drafted from an acquiror's
perspective and they provide for the classic
force-the-vote scenario. This has become, in
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JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
my experience, fairly typical in stock-for-stock
deals, even in stock-for-stock deals where only
a very small portion of the target's stock is
locked up by the acquiror with stockholder
voting agreements. Joel, just to make sure
everyone understands how this provision
operates, why don't you take us through what
happens under your form of agreement [in
AppendixJ] if a third party comes in and makes
a clearly superior offer to acquire the target
company. Can the target company simply
accept the offer at that point?
No, it can't. The way this agreement is con-
structed, the target really doesn't have that
option. The board may be able to pull its rec-
ommendation of the initial deal, as we noted
before. Certainly the target has to be candid
with its stockholders in telling them about the
competing offer. But the target's options are
very limited. It's the acquiror that has options.
It can decide, we're taking our deal to the tar-
get's stockholders anyway; we want them to
vote on it and only if they vote it down (which
is an event that triggers the payment to us of a
break-up fee) can the target go and try to make
a deal with the third party that lobbed in the
competing offer. As an acquiror, what you're
trying to get here is the benefit of the uncer-
tainty faced by the target and its stockholders.
Specifically, the target's stockholders will be
faced with a situation in which they have to vote
on your deal, not knowing at the time the vote
is taken whether the target is ultimately going to
be able to get a definitive contract from the third
party that made the competing offer.
So basically the acquiror has two choices. One,
cut it off right now and collect its termination
fee - 4% of the deal value, cash on the barrel-
head right then and there; or two, take it to a
vote of the target's stockholders - if the stock-
NEGOTIATING ACQUISITIONS
JOEL GREENBERG:(Acquiror Counsel)
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
CHIEFJUSTICE VEASEY:
holders vote it up, great, deal's done; if the
stockholders vote it down, terminate the deal
then and collect the full 4% break-up fee then.
Joel, what happens if the third party's
competing bid is not clearly superior and, in
fact, the target company's board of directors
continues to support the original deal, the deal
covered by this merger agreement? What then?
Well, at that point, unless one of the other
events that constitutes a triggering event occurs,
such as the third party going out and buying
stock in the target company and going over the
threshold specified in the triggering event
definition, there isn't a right to terminate the
merger agreement on the part of either party.
So the original deal will still go to the target's
stockholders, but there again we do have a
provision stating that the acquiror gets its full
break-up fee if the stockholders vote the deal
down after a competing deal has been
announced.
A full 4%, payable immediately in cash. And
indeed,Joel, doesn't your draft also provide that
even if you don't get to a stockholder vote
before reaching the drop-dead date, as long as
there's a competing bid out there when you hit
that drop-dead date, the acquiring company gets
its full break-up fee?
That's right, because the assumption is that the
reason you didn't get the deal done before the
drop-dead date is that the target was stalling -
waiting for time to expire on the original deal -
so it could accept the competing offer.
I have a question. In your practical experience,
you're using this leverage and going up to the
brink and so forth. How many of these
competing offers that you get on the threshold
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JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
CHIEF JUSTICE VFASE:
JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
of the stockholders voting on a deal actually end
up in some new deal, some newly negotiated
transaction?
My own experience would be that, if a serious,
superior competing bid emerges, usually the
acquiror in the original deal won't force that
original deal to a vote, absent a voting lockup
from a significant stockholder. Ifthe competing
bid is clearly superior, it becomes evident to
everybody after a while that it's going to be an
exercise in futility to force the vote on the
original deal. That's what happened with
Warner-Lambert and American Home Products
when Pfizer came in. At some point the 20
billion dollar difference in price mattered to the
market and -
It wasn't just walking around money.
- and the parties realized that the Warner/AHP
deal could not happen, so it never got to the
point where it was forced to a vote even though
the merger agreement permitted AHP to dojust
that.
So one last question then, Joel, about how this
all fits together under your acquiror-favorable
provision in [AppendixJ]. Suppose there's no
competing bid at all, but for one reason or
another the target company's stockholders don't
approve the deal. Maybe, in our hypothetical,
stock-for-stock deal with a fixed exchange ratio,
the acquiring company's stock price has gone
into the tank because there's been an adverse
change to the acquiring company's business, and
therefore the deal isn't worth so much to the
target company's stockholders anymore. Or
maybe gold has been discovered on the target
company's property. But for some reason, with
no third-party competing bid out there, the
NEGOTIATING ACQUISITIONS
JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
JOEL GREENBERG:
(Acquiror Counsel)
CHIEFJUSTICEVEASEY:
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
target company's stockholders just vote the deal
down. What happens?
Let's assume that the target board continued to
support the deal so that the stockholders acted
contrary to the advice of their board when they
voted the deal down. In this formulation we
provide for the payment by the target of a lower
break-up fee to the acquiror. In this case it's 1%
of the transaction value instead of 4%.
This situation is often referred to as the naked
no-vote situation because there's been a negative
vote by the target's stockholders without any
competing bid affecting their voting decision.
Joel, why do you provide for a lower break-up
fee here? Why don't you allow the acquiror to
collect the full 4% in this naked no-vote
situation?
I think there's a concern about enforceability if
you go for the full 4% in a naked no-vote
situation.
I would think so, in that context, although 4% is
close to the 2% to 3 % that's normally given in
other contexts.
Deal lawyers have been talking a lot about the
Delaware jurisprudence bearing on naked no-
vote break-up fees. There are some lawyers
who construe the Brazen16 case, decided a few
years back, as actually permitting fully-loaded
naked no-vote fees. But, there was another
recent decision, McMillan v. Intercargo, 17 handed
16 Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997).
17 McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492(Del. Ch. April 20, 2000) ([T]he termination fee
was structured so as to be payable only in the event that the Intercargo stockholders rejected the XL
merger and were benefited by a more favorable strategic transaction .... This structure ensured that
the Intercargo stockholders would not cast their vote in fear that a no vote alone would trigger the
fee .... ).
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(Acquiror Counsel)
DENNIS HERSCH:
LOU KLING:
(Target Counsel)
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
down this past April, in which Vice Chancellor
Strine made a statement that could be construed
to cast doubt on the viability of a sizable naked
no-vote fee.
I also think you've got to recognize the realities
of negotiating this type of fee. A target is
presumably going to be very resistant to paying
any fee at all on a naked no-vote. It is going to
argue that this isn't the situation break-up fees
are designed to address. Break-up fees are
typically designed to compensate the first
acquiror when it served as a stalking horse to get
a better deal for the target's stockholders.
Rick, let me throw one at you. Since Delaware
law was changed to say that a transaction can go
to the target's stockholders even if it's no longer
supported by the target's board of directors,
we've seen force-the-vote provisions in some of
the largest stock-for-stock mergers. But there is
also an additional provision that sometimes
sneaks in there that goes even further. It's a
provision that says that, if the deal gets voted
down by the target company's stockholders,
then the target company's board will not submit
any other deal to its stockholders for a year.
How do you guys feel about that?
Well, I'm not crazy about it. (Laughter) I've
never liked these tail provisions, either in voting
agreements or in merger agreements.
And you sometimes do see these provisions in
stockholder voting agreements. But from a
fiduciary perspective, there's a difference
between what you can agree to as a stockholder
and what a board can agree to.18
to A tail (lock-out) provision was voided in First Union Corp. v. Suntrust Banks (N. Car. Gen.
Ct. ofJustice, Super. Ct. Div.,July 20, 2001).
NEGOTIATING ACQUISITIONS
Before we conclude our presentation, I'd
like to spend just a minute talking about the size
of the break-up fees payable in these deals. Is
4% too high? What is the maximum size, and
does the maximum size change depending on
whether or not you're in Revlon19 mode? We've
had Chancellor Chandler suggest in the Phelps
Dodge 20 case that 6.3% may be too high in a non-
Revlon stock swap. We've had Vice Chancellor
Strine say in the Intercargo2l case that 3.5% is at
the high end of what the Delaware courts have
approved, but still within the range that is
generally considered reasonable. We don't have
time to discuss these issues today, but they are
issues you have to confront when negotiating
these deals.
We've run out of time. Obviously we've
only had the opportunity to scratch the surface
today; we've touched on just a handful of the
dozens of tricky issues that arise in public
company acquisition negotiations. Thanks for
your attention.
t9 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. CypressAmaxMinerals Co. Del. Ch., CA Nos. 17398,17383,17427,
1999WL 1054255 Chandler. C. (Sept. 27,1999). But. First Union Corp v. Suntrust Banks,supra note
18 (stock option effectively equivalent to a break-up fee of approximately 5.8% upheld).
21 McMillan, 786 A.2d 492. See also In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S'holders Litigation (Del. Ch. Feb.
5, 2001) (3% termination fee upheld).
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APPENDIXA
Excerpts From Target Company's Form of Confidentiality Agreement
(Including Standstill Provision)
2. LIMITATION ON USE OF CONFIDENTAL INFORMATION. The
Prospective Acquiror agrees that neither the Prospective Acquiror nor any
of its Representatives will use any Confidential Information in any manner
except for the specific purpose of evaluating and pursuing a negotiated
acquisition of the Target. ,
8. STANDSTILLPROVISION. The Prospective Acquiror agrees that, during
the three-year period commencing on the date of this agreement (the
Standstill Period), neither the Prospective Acquiror nor any of the
Prospective Acquiror's Representatives will, in any manner, directly or
indirectly:
(a) make, effect, initiate, cause or participate in: (i) any acquisition
of beneficial ownership of any securities of the Target or any
securities of any subsidiary or other affiliate of the Target, (ii) any
acquisition of any assets of the Target or any assets of any subsidiary
or other affiliate of the Target, (iii) any tender offer, exchange offer,
merger, business combination, recapitalization, restructuring,
liquidation, dissolution or extraordinary transaction involving the
Target or any subsidiary or other affiliate of the Target, or involving
any securities or assets of the Target or any securities or assets of any
subsidiary or other affiliate of the Target, or (iv) any solicitation of
proxies (as those terms are used in the proxy rules of the Securities
and Exchange Commission) or consents with respect to any
securities of the Target;
(b) form,join or participate in a group (as defined in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the rules promulgated thereunder) with
respect to the beneficial ownership of any securities of the Target;
(c) act, alone or in concert with others, to seek to control or
influence the management, board of directors or policies of the
Target;
(d) take any action that could reasonably be expected to require the
Target to make a public announcement regarding any of the types
of matters set forth in clause (a) of this sentence;
(e) agree or offer to take, or encourage or propose (publicly or
otherwise) the taking of, any action referred to in clause (a), (b), (c)
or (d) of this sentence;
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(f) assist, induce or encourage any other Person to take any action
of the type referred to in clause (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e) of this
sentence;
(g) enter into any discussions, negotiations, arrangement or
agreement with any other Person relating to any of the foregoing;, or
(h) request or propose that the Target or any of the Target's
Representatives amend, waive or consider the amendment or waiver
of any provision set forth in this section 8.
The expiration of the Standstill Period will not terminate or
otherwise affect any of the other provisions of this agreement.
For purposes of this agreement, a party's Representatives will be deemed to
include each Person that is or becomes (i) a subsidiary or other affiliate of
such party, or (ii) an officer, director, employee, partner, attorney, advisor,
accountant, agent or representative of such party or of any of such party's
subsidiaries or other affiliates.
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APPENDIX B
Sample Response by Acquiring Company to Standstill Provision
Proposed by Target Company
" Shorten duration of Standstill Period to 180 days
" Delete references to affiliate of Target
* Replace Representatives with subsidiaries
* Add the following fall-away provision:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this agreement,
if, at any time during the Standstill Period, a third party: (i) commences a
tender offer for at least 50% of the outstanding capital stock of the Target,
(ii) commences a proxy contest with respect to the election of any directors
of the Target, or (iii) enters into an agreement with the Target
contemplating the acquisition (by way of merger, tender offer or otherwise)
of at least 50% of the outstanding capital stock of the Target or all or
substantially all of the Target's assets, then (in any of such cases) the
restrictions set forth in this section 8 shall immediately terminate and cease
to be of any further force or effect.
Provide the Prospective Acquiror with a 30-day exclusivity (no-
shop) agreement executed on behalf of the Target (see Appendix
C), in exchange for the Prospective Acquiror's agreement to the
inclusion of a standstill provision
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APPENDIX C
Acquiring Company's Form of Exclusivity (No-Shop) Agreement
[Target]
120
Re: Possible Transaction Involving [Prospective Acquiror]
and [Target]
Ladies and Gentlemen:
(the Target) has advised (the Prospective
Acquiror) that the Target wishes to engage in negotiations with the
Prospective Acquiror regarding a possible transaction involving the
Prospective Acquiror and the Target (a Possible Transaction). In order to
induce the Prospective Acquiror to enter into negotiations with the Target
regarding a Possible Transaction (and in recognition of the time and effort
that the Prospective Acquiror may expend and the expenses that the
Prospective Acquiror may incur in pursuing these negotiations and in
investigating the Target's business), the Target, intending to be legally
bound, agrees as follows:
1. The Target acknowledges and agrees that, until the earlier of
2001 or the date on which the Prospective Acquiror advises the Target in
writing that the Prospective Acquiror is terminating all negotiations
regarding a Possible Transaction, the Target will not, and will not authorize
or permit any of its Representatives (as defined in section 6 below) to,
directly or indirectly:
(a) solicit or encourage the initiation or submission of any
expression of interest, inquiry, proposal or offer from any person or
entity (other than the Prospective Acquiror) relating to a possible
Acquisition Transaction (as defined in section 6 below);
(b) participate in any discussions or negotiations or enter into any
agreement with, or provide any non-public information to, any
person or entity (other than the Prospective Acquiror) relating to or
in connection with a possible Acquisition Transaction; or
(c) entertain, consider or accept any proposal or offer from any
person or entity (other than the Prospective Acquiror) relating to a
possible Acquisition Transaction.
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The Target shall, and shall cause each of its Representatives to, immediately
discontinue any ongoing discussions or negotiations (other than any ongoing
discussions with the Prospective Acquiror) relating to a possible Acquisition
Transaction, and shall promptly provide the Prospective Acquiror with an
oral and a written description of any expression of interest, inquiry, proposal
or offer relating to a possible Acquisition Transaction that is received by the
Target or by any of the Target's Representatives from any person or entity
(other than the Prospective Acquiror) on or prior to _ , 2001.
2. The Target acknowledges and agrees that neither this letter agreement
nor any action taken in connection with this letter agreement will give rise
to any obligation on the part of the Prospective Acquiror (a) to continue any
discussions or negotiations with the Target, or (b) to pursue or enter into
any transaction or relationship of any nature with the Target.
3. The Target shall not make or permit any disclosure to any person or
entity regarding: (a) the existence or terms of this letter agreement, (b) the
existence of discussions or negotiations between the Target and the
Prospective Acquiror, or (c) the existence or terms of any proposal regarding
a Possible Transaction.
4. The Target acknowledges and agrees that, in addition to all other
remedies available (at law or otherwise) to the Prospective Acquiror, the
Prospective Acquiror shall be entitled to equitable relief (including
injunction and specific performance) as a remedy for any breach or
threatened breach of any provision of this letter agreement. The Target
further acknowledges and agrees that the Prospective Acquiror shall not be
required to obtain, furnish or post any bond or similar instrument in
connection with or as a condition to obtaining any remedy referred to in this
section 4, and the Target waives any right it may have to require that the
Prospective Acquiror obtain, furnish or post any such bond or similar
instrument.
5. This letter agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance
with the laws of the State of _ (without giving effect to principles of
conflicts of laws). The Target: (a) irrevocably and unconditionally consents
and submits to the jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located in the
State of for purposes of any action, suit or proceeding arising out
of or relating to this letter agreement; (b) agrees that service of any process,
summons, notice or document by U.S. mail addressed to the Target at the
address set forth at the beginning of this letter agreement shall be deemed
to constitute effective service thereof for purposes of any action, suit or
proceeding arising out of or relating to this letter agreement; (c) irrevocably
and unconditionally waives any objection to the laying of venue of any
action, suit or proceeding arising out of or relating to this letter agreement
in any state or federal court located in the State of ; and (d)
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irrevocably and unconditionally waives the right to plead or claim, and
irrevocably and unconditionally agrees not to plead or claim, that any action,
suit or proceeding arising out of or relating to this letter agreement that is
brought in any state or federal court located in the State of has
been brought in an inconvenient forum.
6. For purposes of this letter agreement:
(a) The Target's Representatives shall include its officers, directors,
employees, affiliates, attorneys, advisors, accountants, agents and
representatives.
(b) Acquisition Transaction shall mean any transaction involving:
(i) the sale, license, disposition or acquisition of all or a material
portion of the business or assets of the Target or any direct or
indirect subsidiary or division of the Target;
(ii) the issuance, grant, disposition or acquisition of: (A) any
capital stock or other equity security of the Target or any direct
or indirect subsidiary of the Target, (B) any option, call, warrant
or right (whether or not immediately exercisable) to acquire any
capital stock or other equity security of the Target or any direct
or indirect subsidiary of the Target, or (C) any security,
instrument or obligation that is or may become convertible into
or exchangeable for any capital stock or other equity security of
the Target or any direct or indirect subsidiary of the Target; or
(iii) any merger, consolidation, business combination, share
exchange, reorganization or similar transaction involving the
Target or any direct or indirect subsidiary of the Target;provided,
however, that (A) the grant of stock options by the Target to its
employees in the ordinary course of business will not be deemed
to be an Acquisition Transaction if such grant is made pursuant
to the Target's existing stock option plans and is consistent with
the Target's past practices, and (B) the issuance of stock by the
Target to its employees upon the exercise of outstanding stock
options will not be deemed to be an Acquisition Transaction.
Very truly yours,
[Prospective Acquiror]
By:
ACKNOWLEDGED AND AGREED:
[Target]
By:
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APPENDIX D
Sample Closing Conditions in Acquiring Company's Form of
Merger Agreement for a Stock-for-Stock Merger
Involving Two Publicly Traded Companies
ARTICLE VII: CONDITIONS TO MERGER
7.1 CONDITIONS TO OBLIGATION OF EACH PARTY. The obligation
of each party to effect the Merger is subject to the satisfaction, at or prior
to the Closing, of each of the following conditions:
(a) Effectiveness of Registration Statement. The Registration Statement
shall have become effective in accordance with the provisions of the
Securities Act; no stop order suspending the effectiveness of the
Registration Statement shall have been issued by the SEC; and no
proceeding shall have been initiated or threatened in writing by the SEC
for the purpose of seeking or obtaining such a stop order.
(b) Stockholder Approval. This Agreement shall have been duly
adopted by the Required Target Stockholder Vote.
(c) HSR Act. The waiting period applicable to the consummation
of the Merger under the HSR Act shall have expired or been terminated.
(d) NYSE Listing. The shares of Acquiror Common Stock to be
issued in the Merger shall have been approved for listing (subject to
notice of issuance) on the NYSE.
(e) No Restraints. No temporary restraining order, preliminary or
permanent injunction or other order preventing the consummation of
the Merger shall have been issued by any court of competent
jurisdiction or any other Governmental Body and shall remain in effect;
and no federal, state, local, municipal, foreign or other law, statute, rule,
regulation or decree that makes consummation of the Merger illegal
shall have been enacted, adopted or deemed applicable to the Merger
and shall remain in effect.
7.2 CONDITIONS TO OBLIGATIONS OF ACQUIROR AND MERGER
SUB. The obligations of the Acquiror and Merger Sub to effect the
Merger are subject to the satisfaction, at or prior to the Closing, of each
of the following conditions:
(a) Accuracy of Representations. Those representations and warranties
of the Target set forth in this Agreement that contain materiality
qualifications shall have been accurate in all respects as of the date of this
Agreement and shall be accurate in all respects as of the Closing Date as
if made on the Closing Date; and those representations and warranties
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of the Target set forth in this Agreement that do not contain materiality
qualifications shall have been accurate in all material respects as of the
date of this Agreement and shall be accurate in all material respects as of
the Closing Date as if made on the Closing Date.
(b) Performance of Covenants. Each of the covenants and obligations
that the Target is required to comply with or to perform at or prior to
the Closing shall have been complied with or performed in all material
respects.
(c) Consents. All material consents, approvals, authorizations, filings
and notices required to be obtained, made or given in connection with
the Merger and the other transactions contemplated by this Agreement
(including those consents, approvals, authorizations, filings and notices
identified in Part 7.2(c) of the Target Disclosure Schedule) shall have
been obtained, made or given and shall be in full force and effect.
(d) Agreements and Documents. The following agreements and
documents shall have been delivered to the Acquiror, and shall be in full
force and effect:
(i) Affiliate Agreements in the form of Exhibit __, executed by
each Person who could reasonably be deemed to be an affiliate of
the Target (as that term is used in Rule 145 under the Securities
Act);
(ii) Noncompetition Agreements in the form of Exhibit __,
executed by the individuals identified on Exhibit __;
(iii) a letter from [the Target's independent accountant], dated as of
the Closing Date and addressed to the Acquiror, reasonably
satisfactory in form and substance to the Acquiror, addressing such
matters as are customarily addressed in comfort letters delivered by
accountants in connection with registration statements similar to the
Registration Statement;
(iv) a legal opinion of [the Acquiror's legal counsel], dated as of the
Closing Date and addressed to the Acquiror, to the effect that the
Merger will constitute a reorganization within the meaning of
Section 368 of the Code (it being understood that (A) in rendering
such opinion, [the Acquiror's legal counsel] may rely upon the tax
representation letters referred to in Section __, and (B) if [the
Acquiror's legal counsel] does not render such opinion, the
condition set forth in this Section 7.2(d)(iv) shall nonetheless be
deemed to be satisfied if [the Target's legal counsel] renders such
opinion to the Acquiror);
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(v) a legal opinion of [the Target 's legal counsel], dated as of the
Closing Date and addressed to the Acquiror, in the form of Exhibit
(vi) a certificate, executed on behalf of the Target by an executive
officer of the Target, confirming that the conditions set forth in
paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (e) and (f) of this Section 7.2 have been duly
satisfied; and
(vii) the written resignations of all officers and directors of the
Target, effective as of the Effective Time.
(e) Employees. None of the individuals identified on Exhibit shall have
ceased to be employed by the Target, or shall have expressed an intention to
terminate his or her employment with the Target or to decline to accept
employment with the Acquiror.
(f) No Material Adverse Change. There shall have been no material adverse
change in the business, condition, capitalization, assets, liabilities, operations,
financial performance or prospects of the Target since the date of this
Agreement, and no event shall have occurred or circumstance shall exist that
could reasonably be expected to result in such a material adverse change.
(g) No Litigation. There shall not be pending or threatened any material suit,
action, proceeding or investigation: (i) challenging or seeking to restrain or
prohibit the consummation of the Merger or any of the other transactions
contemplated by this Agreement; (ii) relating to the Merger and seeking to
obtain from the Acquiror or any of its subsidiaries any damages that are
material to the Acquiror; (iii) seeking to prohibit or limit in any material
respect the Acquiror's ability to vote, receive dividends with respect to or
otherwise exercise ownership rights with respect to the stock of the
Surviving Corporation; or (iv) which, if adversely determined, would have
a material adverse effect on the business, condition, capitalization, assets,
liabilities, operations, financial performance or prospects ofthe Target or the
Acquiror.
7.3 CONDITIONS TO OBLIGATION OF TARGET. The obligation of the
Target to effect the Merger is subject to the satisfaction, at or prior to the
Closing, of each of the following conditions:
(a) Accuracy of Representations. Those representations and warranties of
the Acquiror and Merger Sub set forth in this Agreement that contain
materiality qualifications shall have been accurate in all respects as of the
date of this Agreement and shall be accurate in all respects as of the Closing
Date as if made on the Closing Date; and those representations and
warranties of the Acquiror and Merger Sub set forth in this Agreement that
do not contain materiality qualifications shall have been accurate in all
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material respects as of the date of this Agreement and shall be accurate in all
material respects as of the Closing Date as if made on the Closing Date.
(b) Performance of Covenants. Each of the covenants and obligations that
the Acquiror or Merger Sub is required to comply with or to perform at or
prior to the Closing shall have been complied with or performed in all
material respects.
(c) Documents. The following documents shall have been delivered to
the Target, and shall be in full force and effect:
(i) a legal opinion of [the Target's legal counsel], dated as of the
Closing Date and addressed to the Target, to the effect that the
Merger will constitute a reorganization within the meaning of
Section 368 of the Code (it being understood that, (A) in rendering
such opinion, [the Target's legal counsel] may rely upon the tax
representation letters referred to in Section _ , and (B) if [the
Target's legal counsel] does not render such opinion, the condition
set forth in this Section 7.3(c)(i) shall nonetheless be deemed to be
satisfied if [the Acquiror's legal counsel] renders such opinion to the
Target); and
(ii) a certificate, executed on behalf of the Acquiror by an executive
officer of the Acquiror, confirming that the conditions set forth in
paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) of this Section 7.3 have been duly
satisfied.
(d) No Material Adverse Change. There shall have been no material
adverse change in the business, condition, assets, liabilities, operations,
financial performance or prospects of the Acquiror since the date of this
Agreement, and no event shall have occurred or circumstance shall exist that
could reasonably be expected to result in such a material adverse change (it
being understood that a decline in the Acquiror's stock price shall not
constitute a material adverse change for purposes of this Section 7.3(d)).
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APPENDIX E
Sample Response by Target Company to Closing Conditions
Proposed by Acquiring Company
ARTICLE VII: CONDITIONS TO MERGER
7.1 CONDITIONS TO OBLIGATION OF EACH PARTY. The obligation of
each party to effect the Merger is subject to the satisfaction, at or prior to the
Closing, of each of the following conditions:
(a) Effectiveness ofRegistration Statement. The Registration Statement shall
have become effective in accordance with the provisions of the Securities
Act; no stop order suspending the effectiveness of the Registration Statement
shall have been issued by the SEC; and no proceeding shall have been
initiated or threatened in writing by the SEC for the purpose of seeking or
obtaining such a stop order.
(b) Stockholder Approval. This Agreement shall have been duly adopted
by the Required Target Stockholder Vote.
(c) HSR Act. The waiting period applicable to the consummation of the
Merger under the HSR Act shall have expired or been terminated.
(d) NYSE Listing. The shares ofAcquiror Common Stock to be issued
in the Merger shall have been approved for listing (subject to notice of
issuance) on the NYSE.
(e) No Restraints. No temporary restraining order, preliminary or
permanent injunction or other order preventing the consummation of the
Merger shall have been issued since the date of this Agreement by any U.S.
federal or state court of competent jurisdiction and shall remain in effect;
and no U.S. federal or state law, statute, rule, regulation or decree that
makes consummation of the Merger illegal shall have been enacted or
adopted since the date of this Agreement and shall remain in effect.
7.2 CONDITIONS TO OBLIGATIONS OF ACQUIROR AND MERGER SUB.
The obligations of the Acquiror and Merger Sub to effect the Merger are
subject to the satisfaction, at or prior to the Closing, of each of the following
* conditions:
(a) Accuracy ofRepresentations. The representations and warranties of the
Target set forth in this Agreement (except for any representation or warranty
of the Target that refers specifically to the date of this Agreement or to any
other date other than the Closing Date) shall be accurate in all respects as of
the Closing Date as if made on the Closing Date, and each representation or
warranty of the Target that refers specifically to the date of this Agreement
or to any other date other than the Closing Date shall have been accurate in
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all respects as of the date referred to in such representation or warranty;
provided, however, that for purposes of determining the accuracy of the
representations and warranties of the Target set forth in this Agreement, any
inaccuracy that does not have a Target Material Adverse Effect shall be
disregarded.
(b) Performance of Covenants. Each of the covenants and obligations that
the Target is required to comply with or to perform at or prior to the
Closing shall have been complied with or performed in all material respects.
(c) Consents. All consents, approvals, authorizations, filings and notices
identified in Part 7.2(c) of the Target Disclosure Schedule shall have been
obtained, made or given and shall be in full force and effect, except where
the failure to obtain, make or give such consents, approvals, authorizations,
filings and notices would not have a Target Material Adverse Effect.
(d) Agreements and Documents. The following agreements and documents
shall have been delivered to the Acquiror, and shall be in full force and
effect:
(i) Affiliate Agreements in the form of Exhibit __, executed by
each Person who could reasonably be deemed to be an affiliate of
the Target (as that term is used in Rule 145 under the Securities
Act);
(ii) a legal opinion of [the Acquiror's legal counsel], dated as of the
Closing Date and addressed to the Acquiror, to the effect that the
Merger will constitute a reorganization within the meaning of
Section 368 of the Code (it being understood that (A) in rendering
such opinion, [the Acquiror's legal counsel] may rely upon the tax
representation letters referred to in Section _, and (B) if [the
Acquiror's legal counsel] does not render such opinion, the
condition set forth in this Section 7.2(d)(ii) shall nonetheless be
deemed to be satisfied if [the Target's legal counsel] renders such
opinion to the Acquiror); and
(iii) a certificate, executed on behalf of the Target by an executive
officer of the Target, confirming that the conditions set forth in
paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) of this Section 7.2 have been duly
satisfied.
(e) No Material Adverse Effect. Since the date of this Agreement, there
shall not have occurred a Target Material Adverse Effect.
(f) No Governmental Litigation. There shall not be pending against the
Acquiror, before any U.S. federal or state court of competent jurisdiction,
any suit, action or proceeding challenging the Merger commenced by any
U.S. federal or state Governmental Body in which there is a reasonable
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likelihood of a judgment against the Acquiror providing for an award of
damages or other relief that would have an Acquiror Material Adverse Effect.
7.3 CONDITIONS TO OBLIGATION OF TARGET. The obligation of the
Target to effect the Merger is subject to the satisfaction, at or prior to the
Closing, of each of the following conditions:
(a) Accuracy of Representations. The representations and warranties of the
Acquiror and Merger Sub set forth in this Agreement (except for any
representation or warranty of the Acquiror or Merger Sub that refers
specifically to the date of this Agreement or to any other date other than the
Closing Date) shall be accurate in all respects as of the Closing Date as if
made on the Closing Date, and each representation or warranty of the
Acquiror or Merger Sub that refers specifically to the date of this Agreement
or to any other date other than the Closing Date shall have been accurate in
all respects as of the date referred to in such representation or warranty;
provided, however, that for purposes of determining the accuracy of the
representations and warranties of the Acquiror and Merger Sub set forth in
this Agreement, any inaccuracy that does not have an Acquiror Material
Adverse Effect shall be disregarded.
(b) Performance of Covenants. Each of the covenants and obligations that
the Acquiror or Merger Sub is required to comply with or to perform at or
prior to the Closing shall have been complied with or performed in all
material respects.
(c) Documents. The following documents shall have been delivered to
the Target, and shall be in full force and effect:
(i) a legal opinion of [the Target's legal counsel], dated as of the
Closing Date and addressed to the Target, to the effect that the
Merger will constitute a reorganization within the meaning of
Section 368 of the Code (it being understood that (A) in rendering
such opinion, [the Target's legal counsel] may rely upon the tax
representation letters referred to in Section _, and (B) if [the
Target's legal counsel] does not render such opinion, the condition
set forth in this Section 7.3(c)(i) shall nonetheless be deemed to be
satisfied if [the Acquiror's legal counsel] renders such opinion to the
Target); and
(ii) a certificate, executed on behalf of the Acquiror by an executive
officer of the Acquiror, confirming that the conditions set forth in
paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) of this Section 7.3 have been duly
satisfied.
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(d) No Material Adverse Effect. Since the date of this Agreement, there
shall not have occurred an Acquiror Material Adverse Effect.
7.4 FRUSTRATION OF CONDITIONS. No party may rely on the failure of
any condition set forth in this Article VII to be satisfied if such failure was
caused by such party's failure to comply with or perform any of its covenants
or obligations set forth in this Agreement.
For purposes of this Agreement:
Target Material Adverse Effect means any change or effect that is
materially adverse to the business, financial condition or results of
operations of the Target and its subsidiaries taken as a whole; provided,
however, that none of the following shall be deemed (either alone or in
combination) to constitute, and none of the following shall be taken into
account in determining whether there has been or will be, a Target Material
Adverse Effect:
(a) any change in the market price or trading volume ofthe Target's
stock;
(b) any failure by the Target to meet internal projections or
forecasts or published revenue or earnings predictions; or
(c) any adverse change or effect (including any litigation, loss of
employees, cancellation of or delay in customer orders,
reduction in revenues or income or disruption of business
relationships) arising from or attributable or relating to:
(i) the announcement or pendency of the Merger,
(ii) conditions affecting the industry or industry sector in which
the Target or any of its subsidiaries participates, the U.S.
economy as a whole or any foreign economy in any location
where the Target or any of its subsidiaries has material
operations or sales,
(iii) legal, accounting, investment banking or other fees or
expenses incurred in connection with the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement,
(iv) the payment of any amounts due to, or the provision of any
other benefits to, any officers or employees under employment
contracts, non-competition agreements, employee benefit plans,
severance arrangements or other arrangements in existence as of
the date of this Agreement,
(v) compliance with the terms of, or the taking of any action
required by, this Agreement,
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(vi) the taking of any action approved or consented to by the
Acquiror,
(vii) any change in accounting requirements or principles or any
change in applicable laws, rules or regulations or the
interpretation thereof, or
(viii) any action required to be taken under applicable laws,
rules, regulations or agreements.
AcquirorMaterialAdverse Effect means any change or effect that
is materially adverse to the business, financial condition or results of
operations of the Acquiror and its subsidiaries taken as a whole;
provided, however, that none of the following shall be deemed (either
alone or in combination) to constitute, and none of the following
shall be taken into account in determining whether there has been
or will be, an Acquiror Material Adverse Effect:
1. any change in the market price or trading volume of the
Acquiror's stock;
2. any failure by the Acquiror to meet internal projections or
forecasts or published revenue or earnings predictions; or
3. any adverse change or effect (including any litigation, loss of
employees, cancellation of or delay in customer orders,
reduction in revenues or income or disruption of business
relationships) arising from or attributable or relating to:
(i) the announcement or pendency of the Merger,
(ii) conditions affecting the industry or industry sector in
which the Acquiror or any of its subsidiaries participates,
the U.S. economy as a whole or any foreign economy in
any location where the Acquiror or any of its subsidiaries
has material operations or sales,
(iii) legal, accounting, investment banking or other fees
or expenses incurred in connection with the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement,
(iv) the payment of any amounts due to, or the provision
of any other benefits to, any officers or employees under
employment contracts, non-competition agreements,
employee benefit plans, severance arrangements or other
arrangements in existence as of the date of this
Agreement,
(v) compliance with the terms of, or the taking of any
action required by, this Agreement,
(vi) the taking of any action approved or consented to by
the Target,
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(vii) any change in accounting requirements orprinciples
or any change in applicable laws, rules or regulations or
the interpretation thereof, or
(viii) any action required to be taken under applicable
laws, rules, regulations or agreements.
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APPENDIX F
Sample No Solicitation (and No-Talk) Provisions in Acquiring Company's Form
of Merger Agreement for a Stock-for-Stock Merger Involving Two Publicly Traded
Companies
6.3 No SOLICITATION
(a) The Target shall not, nor shall it permit any of its subsidiaries nor shall
it authorize or permit any of its directors or employees or any investment
banker, financial advisor, attorney, accountant or other representative
retained by it or any of its subsidiaries to, directly or indirectly,
(i) solicit, initiate or encourage (including by way of furnishing
information), or take any other action designed to facilitate, any
Alternative Transaction (as defined in Section 6.3(c)), or
(ii) participate in any negotiations or discussions regarding any
Alternative Transaction; provided, however, that if, at any time prior
to the adoption of this Agreement by the stockholders of the Target,
the Board of Directors of the Target determines in good faith, based
on advice from outside counsel, that the failure to provide such
information or participate in such negotiations or discussions would
result in the breach of the fiduciary duties of the Board of Directors
of the Target to the Target's stockholders under applicable law, then
the Target may, in response to any such written proposal that has
been determined by it to be a Superior Proposal (as defined in
Section 6.4(c)) that was not solicited by it and subject to the Target
giving the Acquiror at least two business days written notice of its
intention to do so, (x) furnish information with respect to the
Target and its subsidiaries to any Person pursuant to a customary
confidentiality agreement containing terms no less restrictive than
the terms of the confidentiality agreement entered into between the
Target and the Acquiror, provided that a copy of all such
information is delivered simultaneously to the Acquiror, and (y)
participate in discussions regarding such proposal.
(b) Upon receiving a Superior Proposal, the Target shall promptly (and in
no event later than 24 hours after receipt of any Superior Proposal) notify
the Acquiror orally and in writing of any request for information or of any
proposal in connection with an Alternative Transaction, the material terms
and conditions of such request or proposal (including a copy thereof, if in
writing, and all other documentation and any related correspondence) and
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the identity of the Person making such request or proposal. The Target will
keep the Acquiror informed of the status and details (including amendments
or proposed amendments) of such request or proposal on a continuing basis.
The Target shall immediately cease and terminate any existing solicitation,
initiation, encouragement, activity, discussion or negotiation with any
Person conducted heretofore by the Target or its representatives with
respect to the foregoing. The Target agrees not to release any Third Party
(as defined in Section 6.3(c)) from, or waive any provision of, or fail to
enforce, any standstill agreement or similar agreement to which it is a party
related to, or which could affect, an Alternative Transaction and agrees that
the Acquiror shall be entitled to enforce the Target's rights and remedies
under and in connection with such agreements.
(c) For purposes of this Agreement, Alternative Transaction means, whether
in the form of a proposal or intended proposal, a signed agreement or
completed action, as the case may be, any of the following:
(i) a transaction or series of transactions pursuant to which any
Person (or group of Persons) other than the Acquiror and its
subsidiaries (a Third Party) acquires or would acquire, directly or
indirectly, beneficial ownership (as defined in Rule 13d-3 under the
Exchange Act) of more than 15% of the outstanding shares of the
Target, whether from the Target or pursuant to a tender offer or
exchange offer or otherwise;
(ii) any acquisition or proposed acquisition of, or business
combination with, the Target or any of its Significant Subsidiaries,
as the case may be, by a merger or other business combination
(including any so-called merger-of-equals and whether or not the
Target or any of its Significant Subsidiaries is the entity surviving
any such merger or business combination);
(iii) any other transaction pursuant to which any Third Party
acquires or would acquire, directly or indirectly, control of assets
(including for this purpose the outstanding equity securities of
subsidiaries of the Target, and any entity surviving any merger or
business combination including any of them) of the Target or any
of its subsidiaries, for consideration equal to 15% or more of the fair
market value of all of the outstanding shares of Target Common
Stock on the date of this Agreement; or
(iv) any merger, consolidation, sale of assets or other similar
transaction by or involving a Third Party if, after giving effect
thereto, the stockholders of the Target prior thereto beneficially
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own less than 85% of the outstanding voting stock, common stock
or participating stock of the combined or on-going entity.
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APPENDIX G
Sample Response by Target Company to No-Solicitation
(and No-Talk) Provisions
Proposed by Acquiring Company
6.3 NO-SOLICITATION
(a) The Target shall not, nor shall it permit any of its subsidiaries (and it
shall use its reasonable efforts to cause its directors and employees and any
investment banker, financial advisor, attorney, accountant or other
representative retained by it or any of its subsidiaries not to), directly or
indirectly:
(i) solicit, initiate or encourage (including by way of furnishing
information), or take any other action designed to facilitate, any
Alternative Transaction (as defined in Section 6.3(c)), or
(ii) participate in any negotiations regarding any Alternative
Transaction; provided, however, that if, at any time prior to the
consummation of the Merger, the Board of Directors of the Target
determines in good faith, after receipt of advice from outside
counsel, that the failure to provide such information or participate
in such negotiations creates a reasonable possibility of constituting
a breach of the fiduciary duties of the Board of Directors of the
Target to the Target's stockholders under applicable law, then the
Target may, in response to any such written proposal or indication
of interest relating to an Alternative Transaction which the Target
believes has a reasonable possibility of resulting in a Superior
Proposal (as defined in Section 6.4(c)), (x) furnish information with
respect to the Target and its subsidiaries to any Person pursuant to
a customary confidentiality agreement, and (y) participate in
negotiations regarding such proposal or indication of interest.
(b) Upon receiving a proposal or indication of interest with respect to an
Alternative Transaction, the Target shall, subject to the fiduciary duties of
the Board of Directors of the Target, promptly notify the Acquiror of any
request for information or of such proposal or indication of interest
including the material terms thereof and the identity of the Person making
such request, proposal or indication of interest. The Target shall
immediately cease and terminate any existing solicitation, initiation,
encouragement, activity, discussion or negotiation with any Person
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conducted heretofore by the Target or its representatives with respect to the
foregoing.
(c) For purposes ofthis Agreement, Alternative Transaction means, whether
in the form of a proposal or intended proposal, a signed agreement or
completed action, as the case may be, any of the following.
(i) a transaction or series of transactions pursuant to which any
Person (or group of Persons) other than the Acquiror and its
subsidiaries (a Third Party) acquires or would acquire, directly or
indirectly, beneficial ownership (as defined in Rule 13d-3 under the
Exchange Act) of more than 35% of the outstanding shares of the
Target, whether from the Target or pursuant to a tender offer or
exchange offer or otherwise;
(ii) any acquisition or proposed acquisition of, or business
combination with, the Target or any of its Significant Subsidiaries,
as the case may be, by a merger or other business combination
(including any so-called merger-of-equals and whether or not the
Target or any of its Significant Subsidiaries is the entity surviving
any such merger or business combination);
(iii) any other transaction pursuant to which any Third Party
acquires or would acquire, directly or indirectly, control of assets
(including for this purpose the outstanding equity securities of
subsidiaries of the Target, and any entity surviving any merger or
business combination including any of them) of the Target or any
of its subsidiaries, for consideration equal to 35% or more of the fair
market value of all of the outstanding shares of Target Common
Stock on the date of this Agreement; or (iv) any merger,
consolidation, sale of assets or other similar transaction by or
involving a Third Party if, after giving effect thereto, the
stockholders of the Target prior thereto beneficially own less than
65% of the outstandingvoting stock, common stock or participating
stock of the combined or on-going entity.
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APPENDIX H
Sample Provisions Relating to Target Company's Stockholders' Meeting
(Including Provisions Relating to Recommendation of Merger)
in Acquiring Company's Form of Merger Agreement for a
Stock-for-Stock Merger Involving Two Publicly Traded Companies
6.4 TARGET STOCKHOLDERS' MEETING
(a) Covenant to Hold Meeting and Recommend Adoption of Agreement. As
promptly as practicable after the Registration Statement is declared effective
under the Securities Act (which in turn shall occur as promptly as
practicable after the date hereof), the Target:
(i) shall duly give notice of, convene and hold the Target
Stockholders' Meeting in accordance with the DGCL for the
purpose of obtaining the Required Target Stockholder Vote with
respect to the adoption of this Agreement and
(ii) shall, through its Board of Directors, recommend to its
stockholders adoption of this Agreement by such stockholders.
(b) Withdrawal of Recommendation. Neither the Board of Directors of the
Target nor any committee thereof shall:
(i) withdraw, qualify or modify, or propose to withdraw, qualify or
modify, in a manner adverse to the Acquiror, its recommendation
of the adoption of this Agreement,
(ii) approve or recommend, or propose to approve or recommend,
any Alternative Transaction or
(iii) cause the Target to enter into any letter of intent, agreement in
principle, acquisition agreement or other similar agreement related
to any Alternative Transaction; provided, however, that if the Board of
Directors of the Target determines in good faith, after it has received
a Superior Proposal (as defined in Section 6.4(c)) and based on the
advice of outside counsel, that the failure to do so would result in a
breach of the fiduciary duties of the Board of Directors of the Target
to the Target's stockholders under applicable law, then the Board of
Directors of the Target may (subject to this and the following
sentences) inform the Target's stockholders that it no longer
believes that this Agreement is advisable and no longer recommends
adoption of this Agreement (a Target Subsequent Determination),
but only at a time that is after the fifth business day following the
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Acquiror's receipt of written notice advising the Acquiror that the
Board of Directors of the Target has received a Superior Proposal,
specifying the material terms and conditions of such Superior
Proposal (and including a copy thereof with all accompanying
documentation, if in writing), identifying the Person making such
Superior Proposal and stating that it intends to make a Target
Subsequent Determination. After providing such notice, the Target
shall provide a reasonable opportunity to the Acquiror to make such
adjustments in the terms and conditions of this Agreement as would
enable the Target to proceed with its recommendation to its
stockholders without a Target Subsequent Determination; provided,
however, that any such adjustment shall be at the discretion of the
parties at the time. Notwithstanding any other provision of this
Agreement, the Target shall submit this Agreement to its
stockholders whether or not the Board of Directors of the Target
makes a Target Subsequent Determination.
(c) Superior Proposal. For purposes of this Agreement, a Superior Proposal
means any bona fide written proposal (on its most recently amended or
modified terms, if amended or modified) made by a Third Party to enter
into an Alternative Transaction, the effect of which would be that
stockholders of the Target would beneficially own less than 40% of the
voting stock, common stock and participating stock of the combined or on-
going entity, and which the Board of Directors of the Target determines in
its good faith judgment (based on, among other things, the advice of a
financial advisor of nationally recognized reputation) to be more favorable
to the Target's stockholders from a financial point of view than the Merger,
taking into account all relevant factors (including whether, in the good faith
judgment of the Board of Directors of the Target, after obtaining the advice
of a financial advisor of nationally recognized reputation, the Third Party is
reasonably able to finance the transaction, and any proposed changes to this
Agreement that may be proposed by the Acquiror in response to such
Alternative Transaction).
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APPENDIX I
Sample Response by Target Company to Provisions Proposed by
Acquiring Company Regarding Stockholders' Meeting
(and Recommendation of Merger)
6.4 TARGET STOCKHOLDERS' MEETING
(a) Covenant to Hold Meeting and Recommend Adoption ofAgreement. Subject to
Section 6.4(b), as promptly as practicable after the Registration Statement is
declared effective under the Securities Act, the Target:
(i) shall duly give notice of, convene and hold the Target
Stockholders' Meeting in accordance with the DGCL for the
purpose of obtaining the Required Target Stockholder Vote with
respect to the adoption of this Agreement, and
(ii) shall, through its Board of Directors, recommend to its
stockholders adoption of this Agreement by such stockholders.
(b) Withdrawal of Recommendation. Neither the Board of Directors of the
Target nor any committee thereof shall:
(i) withdraw, qualify or modify, or adopt resolutions to withdraw,
qualify or modify, in a manner adverse to the Acquiror, its
recommendation of the adoption of this Agreement,
(ii) approve or recommend, or adopt resolutions to approve or
recommend, any Alternative Transaction or
(iii) cause the Target to enter into any letter of intent, agreement in
principle, acquisition agreement or other similar agreement related
to anyAlternative Transaction;provided, however, that (x) if the Board
of Directors of the Target determines, in good faith and after receipt
of the advice of outside counsel, that the failure to do so creates a
reasonable possibility of constituting a breach of the fiduciary duties
of the Board of Directors of the Target to the Target's stockholders
under applicable law, then the Board of Directors of the Target may
(subject to this and the following sentences) inform the Target's
stockholders that it no longer believes that this Agreement is
advisable and no longer recommends adoption of this Agreement (a
Target Subsequent Determination), and (y) notwithstanding
anything in Section 6.3 to the contrary and notwithstanding the
foregoing clause (iii) of this Section 6.4(b), the Target may enter
into any agreement otherwise prohibited by Section 6.3 or such
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clause (iii) in connection with the termination of this Agreement
and the concurrent payment of any applicable termination fee, in
accordance with the terms of this Agreement. Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Agreement, unless this Agreement shall have
been terminated, the Target shall submit this Agreement to its
stockholders whether or not the Board of Directors of the Target
makes a Target Subsequent Determination.
(c) Superior Proposal. For purposes of this Agreement, a Superior Proposal
means any bona fide written proposal (on its most recently amended or
modified terms, if amended or modified) made by a Third Party to enter
into an Alternative Transaction, the effect of which would be that
stockholders of the Target would beneficially own less than 50% of the
voting stock, common stock and participating stock of the combined or
on-going entity, and which the Board of Directors of the Target determines
in its good faith judgment (based on, among other things, the advice of a
financial advisor of nationally recognized reputation) to be more favorable
to the Target's stockholders than the Merger, taking into account all relevant
factors (including whether, in the good faith judgment of the Board of
Directors of the Target, after obtaining the advice of a financial advisor of
nationally recognized reputation, the Third Party is reasonably able to
finance the transaction, and any proposed changes to this Agreement that
may be proposed by the Acquiror in response to such Alternative
Transaction).
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APPENDIXJ
Excerpts From Sample Termination and Break- Up Fee Provisions in
Acquiring Company's Form of Merger Agreement for a Stock-for-Stock Merger
Involving Two Publicly Traded Companies
ARTICLE VIII: TERMINATION; TERMINATION FEE
8.1 TERMINATION. This Agreement may be terminated prior to the
Effective Time (whether before or after the adoption of this Agreement by
the Required Target Stockholder Vote):
(c) Drop-Dead Date - by either the Acquiror or the Target if the Merger
shall not have been consummated by _ , 2001 (unless the failure to
consummate the Merger is attributable to a failure on the part of the party
seeking to terminate this Agreement to perform any covenant or obligation
required to be performed by such party at or prior to the Effective Time);
(d) Failure to Obtain Target Stockholder Approval - by either the Acquiror or
the Target ifthe Target Stockholders' Meeting (including any adjournments
and postponements thereof) shall have been held and this Agreement shall
not have been adopted by the Required Target Stockholder Vote; provided,
however, that:
(i) a party shall not be permitted to terminate this Agreement
pursuant to this Section 8. 1(d) if the failure to have this Agreement
adopted by the Required Target Stockholder Vote is attributable to
a failure on the part of such party to perform any covenant or
obligation required to be performed by such party and
(ii) the Target shall not be permitted to terminate this Agreement
pursuant to this Section 8. 1(d) unless the Target shall have made the
payment required to be made to the Acquiror pursuant to Section
8.3(a) and shall have paid to the Acquiror the fee required to be paid
to the Acquiror pursuant to Section 8.3(b) or 8.3(d);
(e) Withdrawal of Support by Target Board - by the Acquiror (at any time
prior to the adoption of this Agreement by the Required Target Stockholder
Vote) if a Triggering Event shall have occurred;
For purposes of this Section 8.1, a Triggering Event shall be deemed to have
occurred if:
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(i) the Board of Directors of the Target shall have: (A) failed to
recommend that the Target's stockholders vote to adopt this
Agreement, (B) made a Target Subsequent Determination or
otherwise withdrawn, qualified or modified, in a manner adverse to
the Acquiror, its recommendation of the adoption of this
Agreement, or (C) taken any other action that would reasonably be
construed to demonstrate that the Board of Directors of the Target
does not support the Merger or does not believe that the Merger is
in the best interests of the Target's stockholders;
(ii) the Target shall have failed to include in the Proxy Statement its
recommendation of the adoption of this Agreement or a statement
to the effect that the Board of Directors of the Target has
determined and believes that the Merger is in the best interests of
the Target's stockholders;
(iii) the Board of Directors of the Target fails to reaffirm its
recommendation of the adoption of this Agreement, or fails to
reaffirm its determination that the Merger is in the best interests of
the Target's stockholders, within five business days after the
Acquiror requests in writing that such recommendation or
determination be reaffirmed;
(iv) the Board of Directors of the Target shall have approved,
endorsed or recommended any Alternative Transaction;
(v) the Target shall have entered into any letter of intent, agreement
in principle, acquisition agreement or other similar agreement
related to any Alternative Transaction;
(vi) the Target shall have failed to hold the Target Stockholders'
Meeting as promptly as practicable and in any event within 45 days
after the Registration Statement is declared effective under the
Securities Act;
(vii) a tender or exchange offer relating to securities of the Target
shall have been commenced and the Target shall not have sent to its
securityholders, within ten business days after the commencement
of such tender or exchange offer, a statement disclosing that the
Target recommends rejection of such tender or exchange offer;
(viii) any Person (or group of Persons) acquires beneficial
ownership (as defined in Rule 13d-3 under the Exchange Act) of
more than 10% of the outstanding shares of the Target; or
(ix) the Target shall have breached any of the provisions set forth
in Section 6.3 [No Solicitation] or 6.4 [Target Stockholders' Meeting].
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8.3 EXPENSES; TERMINATION FEES
(a) Expenses. Except as set forth in this Section 8.3, all fees and expenses
incurred in connection with this Agreement and the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement shall be paid by the party incurring such
expenses, whether or not the Merger is consummated;provided, however, that:
(i) the Acquiror and the Target shall share equally all fees and
expenses, other than attorneys' fees, incurred in connection with (A)
the filing, printing and mailing of the Registration Statement and the
Proxy Statement/Prospectus and any amendments or supplements
thereto and (B) the filing by the parties hereto of the premerger
notification and report forms relating to the Merger under the HSR
Act and the filing of any notice or other document under any
applicable foreign antitrust law or regulation; and
(ii) if this Agreement is terminated by the Acquiror or the Target
pursuant to Section 8.1(c) [Drop-Dead Date] and at or prior to the
time of the termination of this Agreement an Alternative
Transaction or a proposal therefor shall have been disclosed,
announced, commenced, submitted or made, or if this Agreement
is terminated by the Acquiror or the Target pursuant to Section
8.1(d) [Failure to Obtain Target Stockholder Approval] or by the
Acquiror pursuant to Section 8.1 (e) [Withdrawal of Support by Target
Board], then (without limiting any obligation of the Target to pay
any fee payable pursuant to Section 8.3(b) or Section 8.3(d)) the
Target shall make a nonrefundable cash payment to the Acquiror, at
the time specified in Section 8.3(c), in an amount equal to the
aggregate amount of all fees and expenses (including all attorneys'
fees, accountants' fees, financial advisory fees and filing fees) that
have been paid or that may become payable by or on behalf of the
Acquiror in connection with the preparation and negotiation of this
Agreement and otherwise in connection with the Merger.
(b) Termination Fee Payable by Target After Naked No Vote. If this Agreement
is terminated by the Acquiror or the Target pursuant to Section 8.1(d)
[Failure to Obtain Target Stockholder Approval], then (unless the Acquiror is
then entitled to receive a fee pursuant to Section 8.3(d)) the Target shall pay
to the Acquiror, in cash at the time specified in Section 8.3(c) (and in
addition to the amounts payable by the Target pursuant to Section 8.3(a)) a
nonrefundable fee in an amount equal to $ [1% of aggregate
transaction value].
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(c) Time of Payment. In the case of termination of this Agreement by the
Target pursuant to Section 8.1(c) [Drop-Dead Date] or 8.1(d) [Failure to
Obtain Target Stockholder Approval], any nonrefundable payment required to
be made pursuant to clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 8.3(a) shall be
made, and any fee payable pursuant to Section 8.3(b) shall be paid, by the
Target prior to the time of such termination; and in the case of termination
of this Agreement by the Acquiror pursuant to Section 8.1(b) [Drop-Dead
Date], 8.1(d) [Failure to Obtain Target Stockholder Approval] or 8.1(e)
[Withdrawal of Support by Target Board], any nonrefundable payment required
to be made pursuant to clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 8.3(a) shall be
made, and any fee payable pursuant to Section 8.3(b) shall be paid, by the
Target within two business days after such termination.
(d) Termination Fee Payable by Target after Triggering Event or Competing Bid.
If (i) this Agreement is terminated by the Acquiror or the Target pursuant
to Section 8.1(c) [Drop-Dead Date] or 8.1(d) [Failure to Obtain Target
Stockholder Approval], and at or prior to the time of the termination of this
Agreement an Alternative Transaction or a proposal therefor shall have been
disclosed, announced, commenced, submitted or made, or (ii) this
Agreement is terminated by the Acquiror pursuant to Section 8.1(e)
[Withdrawal of Support by Target Board], then the Target shall pay to the
Acquiror, in cash at the time specified in the next sentence (and in addition
to the amounts payable pursuant to Section 8.3(a)), a nonrefundable fee in
an amount equal to $ [4% of the aggregate transaction value]. In the
case of termination of this Agreement by the Target pursuant to Section
8.1(c) [Drop-Dead Date] or 8.1(d) [Failure to Obtain Target Stockholder
Approval], the fee referred to in the preceding sentence shall be paid by the
Target prior to the time of such termination; and in the case of termination
of this Agreement by the Acquiror pursuant to Section 8.1(c) [Drop-Dead
Date], 8.1(d) [Failure to Obtain Target Stockholder Approval] or 8.1(e)
[Withdrawal of Support by Target Board], the fee referred to in the preceding
sentence shall be paid by the Target within two business days after such
termination.
(e) Remedies for Delinquent Payments. If the Target fails to pay when due any
amount payable under this Section 8.3, then (i) the Target shall reimburse
the Acquiror for all costs and expenses (including fees and disbursements of
counsel) incurred in connection with the collection of such overdue amount
and the enforcement by the Acquiror of its rights under this Section 8.3, and
(ii) the Target shall pay to the Acquiror interest on such overdue amount
(for the period commencing as of the date such overdue amount was
originally required to be paid and ending on the date such overdue amount
is actually paid to the Acquiror in full) at an annual rate three percentage
points above the prime rate (as announced by or any
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successor thereto) in effect on the date such overdue amount was originally
required to be paid.
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APPENDIX K
Sample Response by Target Company to Termination and Break- Up Fee Provisions
Proposed by Acquiring Company
ARTICLE VIII: TERMINATION; TERMINATION FEE
8.1 TERMINATION. This Agreement may be terminated prior to the
Effective Time (whether before or after the adoption of this Agreement by
the Required Target Stockholder Vote):
(c) Drop-Dead Date - by either the Acquiror or the Target if the Merger
shall not have been consummated by _ , 2001 (unless the failure to
consummate the Merger is attributable to a failure on the part of the party
seeking to terminate this Agreement to perform any covenant or obligation
required to be performed by such party at or prior to the Effective Time);
(d) Failure to Obtain Target Stockholder Approval - by either the Acquiror or
the Target if the Target Stockholders' Meeting (including any adjournments
and postponements thereof) shall have been held and this Agreement shall
not have been adopted by the Required Target Stockholder Vote;
(e) Withdrawal of Support by Target Board - by either the Acquiror or the
Target if the Board of Directors of the Target shall have (i) made and
announced a Target Subsequent Determination or otherwise withheld,
withdrawn or qualified or modified in a manner adverse to the Acquiror the
recommendation of such Board of Directors that the Target's stockholders
adopt this Agreement, or (ii) approved or recommended any Superior
Proposal.
8.3 TERMINATION FEE.
(a) Failure to Obtain Target Stockholder Approval While a Competing Bid Was
Pending - If'
(i) prior to the time of the Target Stockholders' Meeting at which
a vote is taken by the Target's stockholders on a proposal to adopt
this Agreement, there shall have been publicly announced by a third
party a proposal contemplating an Alternative Transaction,
(ii) such proposal shall have been pending at the time of such Target
Stockholders' Meeting and shall not have been publicly withdrawn,
(iii) this Agreement shall not have been adopted at such Target
Stockholders' Meeting,
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(iv) this Agreement shall have been validly terminated by the
Acquiror or the Target pursuant to Section 8.1(d) [Failure to Obtain
Target Stockholder Approval],
(v) the Acquiror shall not have materially breached any provision of
this Agreement at or prior to the time of the termination of this
Agreement,
(vi) no Acquiror Material Adverse Effect shall have occurred since
the date of this Agreement and no event shall have occurred or
circumstance shall exist that could reasonably be expected to have
an Acquiror Material Adverse Effect, and
(vii) within 270 days after the termination of this Agreement, the
Alternative Transaction contemplated by the proposal that was
pending at the time of such Target Stockholders' Meeting shall have
been consummated by the Target, then the Target shall pay to the
Acquiror the sum of $ [1% of aggregate transaction value]
within five business days after the consummation of such
transaction.
(b) Withdrawal of Support by Target Board. If'
(i) this Agreement shall have been validly terminated by the
Acquiror or the Target pursuant to Section 8.1(e) [Withdrawal of
Support by Target Board],
(ii) the Acquiror shall not have materially breached any provision of
this Agreement at or prior to the time of the termination of this
Agreement, and
(iii) no Acquiror Material Adverse Effect shall have occurred since
the date of this Agreement and no event shall have occurred or
circumstance shall exist that could reasonably be expected to have
an Acquiror Material Adverse Effect, then the Target shall pay to the
Acquiror the sum of $ [1% of aggregate transaction value]
within five business days after the termination of this Agreement.
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